Caracas Chronicles

Since Nicolas Maduro’s swearing-in, the political reality of the country consists of a weakened opposition leadership and a regime ready to exert pressure on it, which was the likeliest scenario after the latest presidential inauguration. Following a known pattern, the government has “unexpectedly” called for an early mega-election for governors, as well as for national and state lawmakers. The opposition is once again faced with a recurring and tiring argument: to vote or not to vote? 

On one side, the new coalition called VEN, led by María Corina Machado and Edmundo González Urrutia, have clearly stated that participating  in the election legitimizes the fraud committed by Maduro last year. Meanwhile, the bloc Venezuela Decide, led by Henrique Capriles and Manuel Rosales, claims that the vote is an opportunity to open a new channel of communication with the regime, to negotiate and gain some ground. The infighting can already be seen as Primero Justicia breaks apart and Un Nuevo Tiempo distances itself from Machado’s leadership, activating the possibility of a restructuring within the opposition.

Recently I had the opportunity to attend an event where Leopoldo López was the main speaker. He referred to the ongoing democratic struggle in Venezuela as a cyclical phenomenon: after every failed attempt to oust Maduro and his cronies, a new movement emerges a few years later and with it a new opportunity. His take was that, unlike other countries where dictators are able to crush the opposition almost permanently, in Venezuela the strength of dissident groups lies in their resilience.

The issue here is that the regime, well aware of this cyclical phenomenon, doesn’t find it difficult to withstand pressure and then strike back to trigger a new process of reform for its opponents, buying enough time to regroup without needing to commit its scarce resources— or to risk socio-economic turmoil in trying to suppress the opposition for good.

With this mega-election, the regime has once again cornered the opposition by creating another divisive conflict and turning them back into a reactive political state. The question on whether the opposition should vote or not is no more than a simple dilemma strategically employed by the regime. Their objective is to supply space for factions of the opposition who have only offered reluctant support to Machado and González Urrutia, so they can defect and undermine the current leadership.  

The real issue at stake in this election isn’t simply whether to vote or abstain, but rather the consequences each choice may bring, when combined. Ultimately, the opposition’s goal should be to turn this moment of fragmentation into an opportunity for consolidation—breaking the cycle that has long undermined its legitimacy and building a unified front capable of effectively challenging the regime on all fronts. To assess the possible outcomes of participation versus abstention, we need to examine three key factors: legitimacy, political momentum, and the state of negotiations.

The pro-voting camp: something is best than nothing

Although Capriles and Rosales acknowledge the red line crossed by the regime after stealing the presidential election, their base case for participation is entrenched on the idea of not losing any type of political space. Their claim is that abstention grants Maduro an open path towards reasserting his control and encourages the regime to hold more “Belarus-style” elections. 

Nonetheless, attempting to escape the inexorable truth that participating in an election organized by Maduro legitimizes the blatant theft of July 28, 2024, raises questions on the commitment of this opposition faction. In fact, moving on to the next electoral contest after millions voted for Gonzalez Urrutia and thousands helped to uncover the election fraud, makes candidates suspect or at least naive. We can already see that in the vast criticism that figures like Capriles and Juan Requenses, confirmed candidates for the election, have received.

From a standpoint of political momentum, the run-up to the election has been characterised by uncertainty and infighting. Although campaigning, even if in short notice, allows for parties and candidates to re-engage with the population, in this case the lack of coordination and political capital makes it impossible to outweigh the regime’s plan to hold a fraudulent vote.

With the May vote, Maduro can accelerate a power struggle within the opposition and distribute power across the regime’s hierarchy.

However, elections can open up space for dialogue and negotiations that the likes of Capriles and Rosales are willing to be involved in. Even if July 28 did not serve to remove chavismo from power, it showed that participation can create windows of opportunities to destabilize the regime. It is an opportunity to diversify efforts and open other paths of confrontation. 

If there is a lesson from so many attempts to oust Maduro throughout the years is that there is no linear path or singular strategy to achieve it. On the contrary, the ability to adapt and act swiftly, in unison, remains what has taken the opposition the furthest. But calls to participate this time are not exactly characterized by unity.

Therefore, for the base case of participation the scenario is clear. Given the lack of legitimacy, momentum and unity to leverage in negotiations, any kind of political space that can be seized will be quickly deprived of any power. The regime will simply use it as a mirage for legitimacy while it cracks down even more on the abstaining leadership, as it happened when opposition governors won back in the 2017 elections: they were sidelined after accepting the regime’s terms and devoid of any agency. 

With the May vote, Maduro can accelerate a power struggle within the opposition and distribute power across the regime’s hierarchy.

The abstentionists: help will come from abroad

Gonzalez Urrutia and Machado have been unwavering on their call for abstention, since the events of last year stripped the electoral roadmap from any avenue of change. They hold that the results of the presidential election and the efforts to uncover the fraud make them deserving of decision-making and support domestically and abroad. They claim that, instead of playing to the regime’s tactics, parties should align behind them in a bloc, and seek ways to uphold the victory of July 28 even if Gonzalez’s swearing-in is uncertain, as long as they can keep the actas that secure Gonzalez’s claim to power.

However, Machado’s reality on the ground is that her ability to re-engage with the population is extremely limited while the regime continues to repress and besiege her allies. As each day passes by and neither her nor González Urrutia provide answers on the next steps, their momentum diminishes. As the regime has stabilized, it is evident how Machado shifted from defying and challenging Maduro to pure reactive politics. Their strategy seems based on the assumption that peaking international pressure will fracture the regime.

However, the main takeaway from this process is the opposition’s inability to sustain a unified front, diving once again into a new cycle of retreat and internal struggle instead of consolidation.

Lobbying the Trump administration comes with a trade-off: accepting the core MAGA immigration policy against hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans in the United States. Although oil licenses have been revoked and stronger sanctions seem to be on the table, the lives of so many migrants are on the edge, facing deportation, returning to Venezuela or even being transferred to jails abroad. It is clear how Machado is prioritizing actions which bring about pressure on the regime over the wellbeing of the Venezuelan diaspora. The silence of the leadership towards the criminalization of Venezuelans in the U.S. stands as well as a risky bet, given the unreliability of Trump to uphold promises to pressure the regime while leaving many Venezuelans stranded abroad.

The regime seems to be unbothered by the humanitarian stunts played by Trump, even to the point of embracing them to create a refreshed antagonising narrative of the United States. Ultimately, the problem with this strategy is that the regime has already shown to be able to withstand this kind of pressure from the U.S. government.

Thus, abstaining from this mega-election is about what will be done instead. The actions of Machado and González Urrutia indicate that, as long as the former stays in the country to keep the spirits high, the latter will remain abroad focused on countries that can apply maximum pressure. Economically, this will burden the country with more hardship as the regime is deprived of oil income and passes that cost onto the population. To appease his expanded elite and avoid a 2017 economic crash that risks social unrest, Maduro will strive to keep a balance between open markets and the regime’s own political security. Diosdado Cabello will likely continue harassing pro-abstention opposition, civil society groups and anyone surrounding Machado.

Fundamentally, the post mega-election scenario for Venezuela rests in the consequences of opposition fragmentation around voting. As a scattered opposition attempts not to waste any political space, the regime will use this opportunity to redistribute power, neutralize any real threat of agency and continue creating conflict within the opposition

In an ideal scenario there is communication between both factions, the abstentionist and pro-participation, in order to reach agreements on how each strategy can contribute towards the same goal of maximum pressure to the regime. However, the main takeaway from this process is the opposition’s inability to sustain a unified front, diving once again into a new cycle of retreat and internal struggle instead of consolidation. Therefore proving what has been mentioned here, that the word unity is currently void of any real meaning, other than a code for parties to tread on each other and seek dominance.