Diosdado Wants to Conquer Zulia with an Anti-Drug Purge
The Interior Minister is sending several mayors to prison on drug trafficking allegations, while building unprecedented influence in the Colombo-Venezuelan border


Oil, geostrategic location, and its contribution to the national economy have made Zulia, throughout its history, one of Venezuela’s most important regions. But today, the state—which borders Colombia’s La Guajira, Cesar, and Norte de Santander departments—has become a hub for air, maritime, and riverine drug trafficking. It is also home to operations by the National Liberation Army (ELN) and dissidents of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).
This is where Interior, Justice, and Peace Minister Diosdado Cabello has chosen to reassert control over the border and all operations in the area. Since his appointment, eight of Zulia’s 21 mayors have been arrested and removed from office. Rafael Ramírez Colina, mayor of Maracaibo, and Nabil Maalouf, from the municipality of Cabimas, were the first to be taken down—both were accused of corruption.
They were followed by Fernando Loaiza Chacón, Danilo Añez, Alberto Sobalvarro, Jorge Nava, and Nervis Sarcos, mayors of the municipalities of Catatumbo, Jesús Enrique Lossada, Almirante Padilla, Miranda, and Colón, respectively. The latest arrest took place on Wednesday, April 2, when the mayor of the border municipality of La Guajira, Indira Fernández—whose capital is Sinamaica—was taken to Caracas and detained at the headquarters of the Bolivarian Intelligence Service (SEBIN).
The eight municipal leaders have been accused of a range of crimes including corruption, drug trafficking, arms trafficking, and smuggling. The operation, led by Minister Cabello, has been dubbed “Operation Lightning.”
This crackdown goes beyond political affiliation. Ramírez, Maalouf, and Sarcos are members of the opposition parties Primero Justicia and Un Nuevo Tiempo, which backed María Corina Machado and Edmundo González Urrutia in last year’s presidential election. Sobalvarro, Nava, Añez, and Fernández belong to the ruling PSUV, while Loaiza is a member of Acción Democrática, aligned with the faction led by secretary-general Bernabé Gutiérrez.
In each municipality, interim leadership has been handed over—per internal regulations—to either a representative from the municipal executive or a member of the local municipal council.
On April 4, while confirming the arrest of the La Guajira mayor, Cabello stated that the mayors—both pro-government and opposition—were “complicit in a vast network of drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and paramilitary training.”
In that same statement, Cabello accused businessman José Enrique Rincón—owner of shrimp farming companies operating along the shores of Lake Maracaibo—of acting as an intermediary for “money laundering and the movement of drugs from Colombia.” Predictably, Cabello blamed María Corina Machado and Edmundo González Urrutia for leading the network, claiming that the mayors allegedly served as links between representatives of the ELN—a known ally of the chavista regime—and major drug cartels.
But although Cabello frames the operation as a fight against guerrilla groups and drug trafficking in Zulia, PSUV sources consulted by #LaHoraDeVenezuela say this is actually an internal struggle for control of the Colombian border—and an effort to block Manuel Rosales from being reelected governor on May 25.
“Cabello has always tried to control the borders. He succeeded before, especially in Apure, Táchira, Bolívar, and Zulia, thanks to his alignment with governors from the PSUV faction he controls. Maduro used the regional political crisis in Zulia (during the 2021 regional elections) to reduce his power. But after the July 2024 elections, Maduro needs to strengthen ties with the military wing and has given Cabello the green light to reestablish order on the border,” explained a political source in Zulia affiliated with the PSUV, who requested anonymity.
The same source said the crackdown on opposition mayors is essentially political—but that PSUV mayors are being punished for “doing business on their own, without respecting the party chain of command.”
The nomination of engineer Luis Caldera as PSUV’s candidate for the Zulia governorship is further evidence of the government’s intent to formalize a power-sharing code in the region. Caldera has been mayor of the municipality of Mara (San Rafael de El Moján)—an area with strong ELN and organized crime presence—for the past 20 years. “Caldera has the support of both Maduro and Cabello, but also of the irregular, non-state groups,” the source added.
His most recent statement on the matter saw Cabello announce the seizure of over 31 tons of cocaine in March, and that “the investigation is ongoing—no mayor is protected.”
Guerrillas and cartels in charge
The report ELN: Corruption, Organized Crime, and Internationalization, published in 2024 by the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation in partnership with Venezuela’s Rebel Alliance Investigates (ARI), explains that the ELN’s presence in Zulia has grown exponentially over the past decade—especially when PSUV controlled both the regional government and all the municipalities. The ELN is now active in at least 10 of Zulia’s 21 municipalities. Four of those were governed by mayors who have since been arrested.
According to local witnesses, both pro-government and opposition mayors have negotiated coexistence agreements with the guerrilla group. “The ELN even funds small infrastructure projects in some municipalities, because no funds come from Caracas or the state government,” said a resident of Jesús Enrique Lossada, where PSUV mayor Danilo Añez was arrested.
Another report—Drug Trafficking in Venezuela 2024: A Business that Enriches Power and Expands, published by Transparency Venezuela in exile—describes the emergence of a trafficking corridor for coca leaf and cocaine. This route, used for air, river, and maritime movement, is controlled by the Cartel of the Suns (Venezuela), the Sinaloa Cartel (Mexico), and the Gulf Clan (Colombia), operating from Norte de Santander through various municipalities in Zulia.
“All this structure is well known to municipal, regional, and national authorities. That’s why Minister Cabello’s actions are less about solving the problem and more about signaling a shift in who wields power in Zulia,” said a source in the security sector.
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