Caracas Chronicles

Less than a month ago, if you walked around the city of Doral in Miami and asked Venezuelans about their opinion of President Trump, many would have answered that not only did they like his vision for America, but that they also had high hopes that the catire would come through on his promise and oust Maduro either forcefully or negotiating. This wasn’t exclusively a layman’s opinion though: the MAGA world seduced many Venezuelan opinion journalists and pundits who considered that the Biden administration did not help Maria Corina Machado enough in her struggle against the Maduro regime.

However, many of them were surprised when they saw that Trump’s first actions regarding Venezuela, rather than deploying Marine troops to Caracas, were the shutdown of almost all pathways for Venezuelans to enter legally to the United States and sending special envoy Richard Grenell to Caracas to negotiate a hostage release with Maduro, in an amicable yet obscure meeting. The latter became Maduro’s biggest political victory in months, as he was able to sell the meeting as a de facto recognition from the U.S. of his authority, however illegitimate.

In a meeting in Doral’s iconic Venezuelan restaurant, El Arepazo, many Venezuelan leaders from both Democratic and Republican affiliations convened in a press conference, stating they felt “betrayed” by the Trump administration for such unfair measures. Especially because the Venezuelan-American community overwhelmingly voted for Trump back in November, a fact the president himself has acknowledged. 

Yet, in my humble opinion, none of this should have been a surprise. Many of these Venezuelans, while hopeful that Trump could break the logjam of the Venezuelan crisis, failed to understand that the Venezuelan and American reality has significantly shifted since 2019.

The failure of sanctions to induce a regime change in Caracas combined with Maduro’s autocratic consolidation has created a situation where President Trump has more of an incentive to deal with Maduro rather than to keep betting on the longshot that has become the Venezuelan democratic cause.

Six years ago, Maduro did not have such a tight grip on power, and the first Trump administration focused heavily on Venezuela. Today’s Venezuelan opposition is much weaker than ever before, with many of its leaders in exile or hiding due to political persecution and the absence of political representation in the government and the regions. Nonetheless, the “maximum pressure” strategy from President Trump’s first term failed to divide the chavista coalition and force Maduro to leave power. In addition, while the U.S. provided certain OFAC licenses to deal with the humanitarian crisis, over-compliance complicated relief efforts, thus aggravating the conditions caused by Maduro. Some experts and government officials argue that the “second and third order” effects of Trump’s sanction policy fueled the Venezuelan migration wave even more. The status quo has presented President Trump with a situation where the Venezuelan opposition does not have the necessary strength to force a transition. On the other hand, Venezuelan migrants kept pouring into the U.S. border. 

This left President Trump with no option other than to negotiate with Maduro if he wants to advance his Venezuela agenda at all. Whatever that may be now.

Nothing sticks to the wall

During his first term, President Trump had leverage against Miraflores as he imposed sanctions. In 2019, the Venezuelan government was dealing with individual and financial sanctions, but it had never experienced the true pressure of banned transactions for the oil industry, its main source of revenue. Back then, the maximum pressure strategy truly pressured Maduro, which is why to this day chavismo still deems this policy a “Yankee blockade” just like the Cuban embargo (even though they are completely different things). However, Maduro has maintained a solid grip on power, and chavismo has adapted the structure of the Venezuelan state to survive regardless of sanctions, to the extent of successfully circumventing them completely. As it usually happens with most sanction regimes over time, the target country becomes accustomed to the new reality, and the sanctions themselves became an asset for the Venezuelan government. 

Now, Maduro uses the narrative of sanctions for political persecution as he imprisons dissidents and civil society members for being “pro-blockade.” He also passed an “anti-blockade” law in the National Assembly that facilitates transactions with the Venezuelan government while encouraging corruption, with some of the tainted money flushing up on the American financial system. All of this is just a speck of how the Maduro regime has been able to reinvent itself in the face of Trump’s “maximum pressure.” However, this has led to a situation where American sanctions do not threaten Maduro much anymore, as he has already lived through the worst Trump can throw at him. Similar to how a disease becomes immune to a certain antibiotic.

As for the U.S., there are few tools left when it comes to the Venezuelan crisis. This situation has left President Trump with not much leverage against Maduro. Yet, with over 600,000 Venezuelans in the U.S. dependent on the TPS and CHNV Parole program for their legal status, migrants are now in the crosshairs of the “America First” adepts in the administration, most of whom are laser-focused on a massive deportation effort as the top priority. The failure of sanctions to induce a regime change in Caracas combined with Maduro’s autocratic consolidation has created a situation where President Trump has more of an incentive to deal with Maduro rather than to keep betting on the longshot that has become the Venezuelan democratic cause.

With a campaign of state terrorism following the July 28th election, the growing erosion of Maria Corina Machado’s leadership and the departure of Edmundo González from the country, Maduro has let the world know that he has absolute control of the Venezuelan territory, whether they like it or not. While this might be a gruesome reality for some, for the America First faction that prioritizes a pragmatic and isolationist approach to foreign policy (with an extreme focus on immigration), the Venezuelan status quo represents an opportunity to negotiate the stability of Maduro while putting the deportation of illegal immigrants in the spotlight for MAGA constituents. In other words, a win-win deal for the agendas of both Maduro and Trump with little opportunity cost. 

…while much of the international community struggles to coexist with an unpredictable Trump administration, Maduro is eager to play ball with the White House, an inclination that the U.S. is holding in high regard.

While some Venezuelan Trump supporters still maintain hopes that Marco Rubio will rein the president on the issue in the future, the Secretary of State has to deal with much of the cabinet, the White House, and other senior staff at the State Department that are adept to this America First Approach, especially on immigration affairs. America First is one of the reasons why Trump has been harder with Panama rather than with Maduro, and why currently, there are more punitive measures against Mexico, an American ally, than against Venezuela, an OFAC-sanctioned country. On the other hand, while much of the international community struggles to coexist with an unpredictable Trump administration, Maduro is eager to play ball with the White House, an inclination that the U.S. is holding in high regard.

While the Venezuelan opposition’s influence continues to diminish, despite ideological differences, Maduro is part of the group of regional leaders willing to dance to Trump’s tango alongside El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele and Argentina’s Javier Milei. MAGA may not have found an ally in Miraflores, but perhaps someone open to implementing their agenda without much of a fight.

Adding to the mix, the Venezuelan oil and gas interests from some of Trump’s biggest corporate donors also weigh on the White House as OFAC’s drilling licenses benefit both American companies and the Venezuelan dictatorship. Currently, it’s hard to say if Trump sees a partner in Maduro, but to the least, he finds a counterpart that can help him advance his America First agenda at the low cost that sanction relief represents to the United States. Such a price remains quite high for ordinary Venezuelans whose struggle for democracy seems more uphill as each day passes. The détente between Washington and Caracas now represents a sword of Damocles hanging over the heads of Venezuelan migrants who now face the prospect of being sent back to a ruthless regime in the name of MAGA nativism.