Caracas Chronicles

#NowWhatVenezuela keeps you informed about what’s happening deep inside la patria—from headline-making events to underreported stories that provide the clearest picture of our reality. This report is published weekly.

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We won’t stop telling you about what’s happening in Venezuela, but this week we’re going to stray a bit from the type of unfolding events and developments this dispatch usually covers.

This time, we turn our focus to the barrage of half-truths and disinformation coming from the new U.S. administration, aimed at convincing a certain naïve audience that Venezuela is doing better—that there are “notable improvements” in the economy, security, and public health, and that therefore Venezuelans facing deportation can return without concern. Without providing data or citing any sources, this is how the Department of Homeland Security justifies revoking Temporary Protected Status for 348,000 Venezuelans.

Next, we’ll break down several recent reports on the performance of Venezuela’s security forces, healthcare system, and economy to understand where we stood even before the July 28 elections—when Donald Trump was already saying that Venezuela, and Caracas in particular, were safe places where he’d be willing to have an interview.

So, how violent is Venezuela today?

At the moment, there is no organization that can provide reliable data on the total number of violent deaths in Venezuela. The director of the CICPC says that in 2023 there were 4.1 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants—the national rate in the United States is 5.8. The Venezuelan Observatory of Violence (OVV)—whose methodology has been refuted by Dorothy Kronick in this blog—claims that the actual rate is 26.8 violent deaths. For now, we will rely on the Monitor de Víctimas, which records homicides and their causes in five Venezuelan entities: the Metropolitan Area of Caracas, and the states of Zulia, Lara, Táchira, and Sucre.

Data from the Monitor de Víctimas confirms that the number of murders has been decreasing since Venezuela’s most violent years (2015-2017), when the rate of violent deaths ranged between 70 and 60. But in its 2023 sample, which recorded 618 cases, police violence appears as the main cause of homicides: state security officers killed at least 151 people. Of course, this is nothing new. Some 37% of the murders recorded by the Monitor de Víctimas in its first five years of existence (2017-2022) were committed by state agents. Between 2020 and 2022, Venezuela reported the highest police lethality rate in the region, according to another organization, the Monitor for the Use of Lethal Force in Latin America and the Caribbean: nationwide, between 21 and 25% of violent deaths are extrajudicial executions carried out by security agents.

The latest report from the Monitor de Víctimas offers qualitative detail and regional differences. In Greater Caracas, Zulia, and Lara—which host 3 of the country’s 4 main cities—state forces were responsible for 36.1%, 53.3%, and 27.6% of homicides, respectively. This means that in Zulia, more than half of the murders were committed by the police (with a rate well above the national average). In Caracas, more than a third of violent deaths are the state’s responsibility.

How do we interpret this? Yes, homicides in Venezuela have decreased, but despite that, state forces continue to maintain the same lethal practices from the past decade, when the FAES and OLP were operating. Although there are fewer extrajudicial executions today than in the times of war against the poor, the police still produce an alarming death toll. By 2022, extrajudicial killings had dropped by 72% compared to 2019, but the lethality rate due to police intervention reached its highest point according to MUFLVEN, the local initiative that monitors the use of public force.

And what about after July 28? Since the protests against Maduro’s electoral fraud, the police have become even more predatory and arbitrary, not only against activists and political leaders but also against ordinary citizens whose families are extorted during arbitrary detentions. Some recent data reflects this repressive escalation:

• Foro Penal (2025): Currently, there are 1,192 political prisoners in Venezuela, a 77% increase compared to April 2024. Of these, 51 remain disappeared, with no knowledge of their place of detention.
• Monitor de Víctimas (2025): Eight out of ten Caracas residents feel fear when passing through a police or military checkpoint, according to a study. A third of those surveyed show symptoms of post-traumatic stress, and the majority take digital precautions, such as using VPNs, avoiding talking about politics, and frequently deleting chats and photos from their phones.

Is the economy doing better?

Venezuela grew by 4% in 2024 and has accumulated a 12-14% growth since 2022, when the eight-year economic collapse that shrank the economy by 80% ended. To return to the point where that decline started, the country would need to grow by 400%, or maintain an annual growth rate of 19% until 2044, according to Venezuelan economist Omar Zambrano.

Poverty has not significantly decreased compared to the worst years of the crisis. According to a survey by think tank Equilibrium from April 2023, 80% of Venezuelans earn less than $200 a month, and only 2% earn $550 or more. In the public sector, the minimum wage is around $130, which includes a base salary of $2.40 and government bonuses.

Meanwhile, the currency continues to lose value. According to the Venezuelan Central Bank (BCV), the bolívar depreciated by 30.9% in 2023, going from 35.9 to 60 Bs per dollar. In the black market, the rate is even higher, reaching 72 Bs per dollar. This growing exchange rate gap has reduced the circulation of foreign currency: by December 2024, only 24.7% of transactions in the country were in foreign currency, according to Ecoanalítica. In Caracas, 90% of transactions are already done in bolívars.

Another key indicator of economic health is access to credit. According to the firm Aristimuño Herrera y Asociados, Venezuela has the smallest credit portfolio in Latin America, despite significant growth last year. Even Nicaragua’s banking system grants more loans than Venezuela’s. This lack of financing represents a critical obstacle for the productive sector. Last year, the area of hectares planted to produce food was reduced by 43% according to trade organization Fedeagro. Food producers warn that they receive payments in bolívars and with delays, which worsens losses and complicates planning.

And the healthcare system?

The Congressional Research Service of the United States still acknowledges that Venezuela’s healthcare system has collapsed. Since 2016, the Ministry of Health has not published bulletins on active diseases in the country.

The shortage of medical supplies remains alarming. According to the latest semi-annual report from the National Hospital Survey (2023):

• 30% of hospitals did not have inhalers for asthma throughout the year, 46% had intermittent access, and only 25% had them consistently.
• Only 35% of hospitals had consistent access to hypertension medications, and only 33% had insulin throughout the year.
• The national shortage index for emergency supplies is 36%, with a much more severe crisis in the regions furthest from Caracas. Health centers in Carabobo (75%) and Amazonas (65%) report the highest shortages in the country.
• 47% of hospitals have no infant formula. Only 21% reported having it every day of the year.
• Only 26% of hospitals provide three daily meals to their patients; in the rest, patients depend on the food their families can bring.