NWV #16: An Election to Ban Them All, a  Reform to Empower Few

The Maduro regime is organizing the most uncompetitive and logistically unserious elections perhaps since universal suffrage exists in Venezuela

What we know about “mega elections” and Communal State reform

On April 27, Venezuela will hold elections for governors, legislative councils, and lawmakers under far worse conditions than just six months ago. At the same time, the regime is advancing its vision of the Communal State, a project Chávez promoted in his final years (this Sunday, for instance, another referendum will take place to approve communal projects). This is not just another election under dictatorship, nor are these trivial reforms for everyday life. Chavismo aims to paint Venezuela’s political and territorial map in red, swiftly and effectively eliminating dissent while favoring individuals tied to communal circuits.

Key takeaways about Maduro’s first elections in 2025:

  • To no one’s surprise, candidates must sign a document pledging to accept as absolute and unquestionable any results announced by the CNE. Francisco Ameliach, spokesperson for the PSUV’s Political and Electoral Organization, ruled out the possibility of the opposition’s MUD appearing on the ballot and stated that only political platforms that obtained at least 1% of the vote in the 2020 parliamentary elections would be allowed to participate this time. Maduro’s Liberator Law will also be used to ban dissidents from running.
  • The announcement comes with barely three months’ notice, despite the logistical challenge of combining three different elections into a single date.
  • Instead of publishing an official notice, the schedule for the mega-elections is being distributed to people via an Excel file on WhatsApp, while the CNE website has been down since July 28 (when Amoroso accused North Macedonia of hacking the institution).
  • The Electoral Registry will be open for less than two weeks and will close on February 10, suggesting that the distribution of voters across nationwide polling stations will remain largely unchanged from July 28.

“The [true and direct democracy] Chávez dreamed of is becoming a reality,” Maduro said regarding Sunday’s communal referendum. “I have the money. And we are releasing the funds to implement these projects.”

The Communal State: an attempt to resurrect vintage chavista governance

Rafael Uzcátegui, director of Laboratorio de Paz, analyzed the reform of the Organic Law of Communes or Ley de Comunas, which came into effect on December 30, 2024. Here are some key points:

  • The legal text states that communes have assumed the responsibilities of local and regional governments—such as management, administration, the control of public services, and public works—but doesn’t explain their relationship with mayoralties and governorships.
  • A commune can be established with just 15% voter participation in an electoral center, though only the Ministry for Citizen Participation can approve its registration.
  • Commune representatives can be removed if they engage in “hate speech” or “fascist discourse,” as defined by the regime.
  • The reform establishes a “commune bank” to transfer funds to the executive council of each commune, though it does not specify the source of these funds.

According to Uzcátegui, the revival of the Communal State seeks to reinforce two traditional pillars of chavista governance: 1) existing mechanisms of social control within communities and 2) the creation of more parallel structures to manage and distribute state resources. Most crucially, the reform aims to preserve chavismo’s social base—specifically, the 30% of voters who supported Maduro on July 28.

Why it matters: In the July 28 presidential election, Maduro won in just 15% of Venezuela’s parishes—169 out of 1,141. These are areas where the PSUV secures votes through the likes of guerrilla groups, armed colectivos, security forces, CLAP food programs, UbCH, and other allied actors who exert clientelist pressure. A recent report from the Derechos Humanos de Venezuela en Movimiento alliance analyzed 133 parishes where Edmundo González lost, finding that vote-buying, coercion, food incentives, and threats of job loss were widespread.

Opposition is fading in Zulia

This week, the regime arrested Nervins Sarcos, mayor of Colón in Zulia state, making him the third mayor detained in the post-election crackdown. Previously, Rafael Ramírez Colina (Mayor of Maracaibo, Primero Justicia) and Nabil Maalouf (Un Nuevo Tiempo) were arrested.

El Pitazo reports that Manuel Rosales is preparing to run in the April 27 elections, distancing himself definitively from María Corina Machado’s leadership. According to a source, Rosales has offered UNT’s ballot slot so that three PJ mayors in Zulia—who are still free—can run.

Further developments: In Maracaibo’s Municipal Council, opposition members signed an “agreement” recognizing the TSJ ruling that declared Maduro the legitimate president, following a tense session with chavista councilors. According to Versión Final, chavista councilors threatened to walk out when the document was not found. Maracaibo’s comptroller was present and warned that he would take action if opposition councilors refused to acknowledge Maduro’s presidency. In the end, a version of the agreement was approved that named Maduro as president but omitted the July 28 election date.

Acción Democrática expelled one of the signatories, councilor Jaime Buelvas, on the same day. The party accused him of surrendering to chavismo after Ramírez Colina’s arrest in October and refusing to follow party directives. Meanwhile, the president of Zulia’s Legislative Council, Iraida Villamil, made no effort to hide her stance. She openly recognized Maduro as the sworn-in president, adding that she wouldn’t want anyone to challenge her position as head of the state chamber.

“That’s the beauty of political life, which has been lost amid so much triviality,” said Villamil, who is also a UNT leader.

Recommended reads:

  • Correo del Caroní: A stunning report documents how the Warao people survive in eastern Venezuela by scavenging through trash and selling what they find to recycling companies.
  • Armando Info: A new set of companies engage in the indiscriminate deforestation of the xerophytic forest in Lara—a protected natural area between Carora and Barquisimeto—as part of the regime’s rush for coal production.
  • Crónica Uno: Data and testimonies reveal the decline of agricultural production in Carabobo state, 20 years after Hugo Chávez’s agrarian reform.
  • El Carabobeño: The Committee for the Freedom of Political Prisoners (Clipp) denounces the dire conditions in Tocuyito, Tocorón, and Rodeo I prisons, where detainees are denied legal defense and held in overcrowded conditions, turning these facilities into concentration camps for their relatives.