Caracas Chronicles

The second most awaited January 2025 date for Venezuelans came and went. We love our deadlines, so long as they are buried deep into the future. Donald Trump’s inauguration as the 47th president of the United States has served as a sort of buffer to anyone trying to explain what the heck is going to happen in Venezuela. “We’ll have to see what’s the approach of the Trump administration,” has been a convenient phrase to avoid answering the question. There was even some wishful thinking that the regional crisis of Maduro’s stolen election would be addressed—president elect Edmundo González Urrutia traveled to DC to attend the ceremony as a special guest of Senator Rick Scott. But there was no mention nor we have seen an Edmundo-Trump meeting so far. Venezuela, however, was featured in the role that it had been playing in the campaign cycle as a device of domestic discourse. Enter the Tren de Aragua mega gang.

While no explicit mention to Venezuelan migrants was made, Trump did say that he would revive the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 to go after the gangs of immigrants terrorizing the U.S. This law, sanctioned during the American Revolution, was mentioned during the campaign trail as a key element of Project Aurora, named after the city in Colorado where alleged members of Tren de Aragua—a gang that expanded from central Venezuela and spread to other countries—had forcefully occupied buildings while armed with long rifles.

The Alien Enemies Act is an obscure law. It was used in wartime, for instance, to put citizens of Japanese origin in concentration camps, as well as German and Italian Americans. An extract reads: “whenever there shall be a declared war between the United States and any foreign nation or government … and the President of the United States shall make public proclamation of the event, all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the hostile nation or government, being males of the age of fourteen years and upwards, who shall be within the United States, and not actually naturalized, shall be liable to be apprehended, restrained, secured and removed, as alien enemies.”

Along with the abovementioned state of emergency declaration, one of Trump’s first executive orders included the intention to designate Tren de Aragua as a terrorist organization. With the combination of these two, the incoming administration may be looking to set the stage to meet the legal requirements to apply the law which is not as straight forward as it looks. In order to activate the law, a formal declaration of war from Congress or a foreign invasion is required.

While in the past few weeks we’ve seen bold comments from Trump’s Latin America hawks, like Secretary of State Marco Rubio saying that Venezuela was governed by a drug cartel, there has been some reluctance from the fresh administration to address the stolen elections and the inauguration of Edmundo González.

From what we’ve seen, there’s been focus on connecting Venezuela and the Maduro regime to drug trafficking, which could perhaps be a way to create an actual threat for Maduro—as we saw how the DEA rewards over chavismo’s two main figures were raised to $25 million each and a new $15 million bounty was added for Vladimir Padrino—but it is also very clearly a strategy that focuses on domestic results. 

Tren de Aragua’s cameo on inauguration day sparked some strange reactions from Maduro & Co. Chavismo’s chief prosecutor posted a statement explaining that Venezuela had dismantled Tren de Aragua in Venezuelan territory, that its international survival could be attributed to former Colombian presidents Álvaro Uribe and Iván Duque, and that they were ushered into the U.S. by members of the Venezuelan opposition.

From our PRR sources, we know that plan A for Maduro & Co. is to offer help (to the Trump administration) in deporting Venezuelans, something that can’t happen unless there’s a diplomatic agreement between the two countries, in exchange for maintaining the status quo of the licenses that allow some countries to operate in the Venezuelan oil industry. The main course in the negotiation table, of course, would be the Chevron license, since it accounts for one third of the crude production in the country.

While we were piecing together the reaction of Maduro associates to the inauguration, Richard Grenell—Trump’s Special Envoy for “Special Missions”—announced via X that he had spoken with Venezuelan officials on inauguration day and that meetings are set to begin this week. “Talking is a tactic (…) Donald Trump is president of the United States again. And diplomacy is back,” Grenell stated. 

Grenell previously served as Acting Director of National Intelligence (2020), U.S. Ambassador to Germany (2018-2020), and spokesperson at the UN under President George W. Bush. In September 2020, months before the end of Trump’s first term, Grenell held secret talks with Jorge Rodríguez to discuss the possibility of a peaceful exit of power for Maduro, according to The New York Times.

Senator Rick Scott snapped back quickly at Grenell’s tweet saying that the only relevant discussions with the chavista regime were the dates of Maduro’s departure from the country and González Urrutia’s inauguration.

But in summary, what Trump laid out on Day 1 was using the alleged threat of Tren de Aragua and violent immigrants to invoke terrorism and wartime laws in order to expel people expeditiously. 

From Trump’s comments, Venezuela and Latin America in general do not appear to be a priority in terms of foreign relations. His discourse about retaking the Panama Canal is focused on the fact that, according to him, it is China who operates the Canal. Yesterday, when he met some journalists in the Oval Office after signing a score of measures, he said that relations with Latin America “should be fine”, but that in any case “they need us more than we need them. Everyone needs us.” In the same tone, he said that he’s watching Venezuela with close attention and that the U.S. will probably cease to buy Venezuelan oil. “We don’t need it.” Again, the focus will be domestic, a point in which he has insisted fervently.

We don’t know yet what the extent of the application of the Alien Enemies Act will be; will they target only criminals or will there be a blanket enforcement of the law like in World War II? Or will it be applied at all? Will Congress meet the legal requirements? Will the Supreme Court uphold it? There’s still an obstacle course of checks and balances before we can see this coming to fruition. But in summary, what Trump laid out on Day 1 was using the alleged threat of Tren de Aragua and violent immigrants to invoke terrorism and wartime laws in order to expel people expeditiously. 

How many Venezuelans will actually be detained and deported to their home country, and what will the Maduro regime do about it, remains to be seen. But given the volume and extent of fear mongering and exaggeration about the supposed threat of Venezuelan illegal migration, Trump will no doubt show force in this matter, at least in the form of a very public spectacle where his voters can see he’s fulfilling his promise.

As far as Venezuela goes, all of the above point toward initially setting the poker table for an oil for migrants deal. This doesn’t mean that down the line there won’t be pressure to push Maduro out via heavier sanctions or else, but it doesn’t seem the priority on Day 1. If it had been, no doubt that we would’ve seen an executive order applying maximum pressure and removing the OFAC licenses. For now, it feels like Trump will be exploring other options. More diplomatic options, perhaps.

Most Venezuelans were watching the inauguration closely, looking for a hint of what would be the degree of support to the Venezuela cause on Day 1. Yeah, it’s always about us! Folks were expecting a mention to the stolen elections, a commitment to help restore democracy or a cameo of the president elect. And while some may juggle their way into a theory that the Venezuela-related measures in some way address it (the Venezuela cause), the truth is that we got attention but not the kind we expected. While both intersect, for the Trump administration the international component of the Venezuela crisis is secondary, and much more difficult to solve, than the domestic threat. Because, remember, America comes first.