Caracas Chronicles

As January 10 approaches, tensions continue to rise in Venezuela with both Edmundo and Maduro declaring to be ready to be sworn into the presidency. However, when attempting to predict what January 11 will hold, it is easy to land in a world of endless possibilities. Scenario planning and analysis avoids this by defining and assessing the most likely outcomes, offering a framework of strategic thinking during this pivotal moment in Venezuelan history.

For this particular case, the Quadrant Matrix method is an approach for risk identification and mitigation that provides a clear set of scenarios by crossing two variables that represent drivers of change. Thus, given that both candidates face the same situation, the swearing into power, our two variables will be Maduro swearing into power (x) and Edmundo swearing into power (y). Referring to the grid below we can see four clear scenarios unravelling:

• Scenario 1: NM swears into power and EGU doesn’t
• Scenario 2: Both swear into power
• Scenario 3: EGU swears into power but NM doesn’t
• Scenario 4: Neither swear into power

Scenario 1: Maduro outmaneuvers the opposition once again

Scenario one, on the upper-left quadrant, is the most likely for January 10. It is not hard to imagine how we get here. The opposition coalition, despite the remarkable organization leading to and during the July 28 election, is yet to show enough muscle to pressure the government into negotiating or flip the key political and military figures needed to get González Urrutia back in the country. The regime will call the bluff on González Urrutia talk of re-entry and he is either forced to take the oath abroad—something he has promised not to do—or in case he attempts to make it back without previous negotiation, face imprisonment or failure to get into the country.

Maduro will face internal and external pressures. However, a prolonged period of civil unrest is unlikely due to the intense post-electoral crackdown. Maduro’s inner circle would be the ultimate winners. The lack of legitimacy would ignite internal power struggles that could lead to a new purge within chavista lines, as Maduro attempts to restabilize the ruling coalition. 

Expectation would be through the roof but without a coordinated plan to break the regime’s coalition, his presence alone will likely not be enough to overrun the regime. González Urrutia will be exposed to arrest or worse, and going back into exile after a failed re-entry could very well be the end of this adventure. How long can he survive in Venezuela as a free man while turning up the heat is key to make this a viable scenario for political change.

These struggles would ultimately die off, paving the way for pragmatism to kick in with the regime regarding the maintenance of commercial and diplomatic ties with adversarial powers. Maduro still has hostages in the Argentinian embassy and María Corina Machado on the run—elements with which it can negotiate. Economically, the country will suffer with the potential of a prolonged state of sanctions due to the standoff. However, Maduro has signalled a reopening of the economy in a new attempt to infuse a bodegonazo 2.0 with the privatization. The new generation of Venezuelan oligarchs would continue to grow, helping him expand the coalition and redistribute resources to key internal and external allies, even if that deepens inequalities and trigger political shocks. As Maduro faces rising public frustration and elite pressures, his next economic policy decision will be crucial in determining his regime’s survival.

For the opposition coalition, this scenario could risk part of its political capital. Failing to gain control will likely hit morale, leading to a significantly weakened leadership and a new wave of migration. A clear and direct communication campaign will be the key to keep the movement alive as they try to pivot the strategy by signalling that the game does not end on the 10th. Machado is then faced with the biggest dilemma yet on whether she stays in hiding—trying to re-engage with the people while awaiting capture—or leaves the country to her detriment as Venezuela’s democratic beacon. The decision depends on how quickly Maduro can turn things around internationally as he loses political and bargaining capital. González is likely to continue the international tour, but they are on the clock to avoid a Guaido phase out.

Scenario 2: The ghost of Juan Guaidó

Keeping in mind that González Urrutia ruled out the possibility of taking the oath abroad, we will focus on the re-entry as the base case for this scenario, where the regime coalition allows his entry but González Urrutia has not enough power to overthrow Maduro in one go. If González Urrutia manages to elude the intelligence services and take a public oath, this could be enough to make Maduro fearful of a collapse of his forces. The other and least likely possibility is that Maduro is pressured enough to let González Urrutia back in attempting to marginalize him as he did with Guaidó after his return. Due to the electoral legitimacy and widespread support for González Urrutia, this could easily backfire by boosting morale for the opposition’s grassroot organization, bringing street demonstrations back on the table.

With González Urrutia in the country and having taken the oath, Maduro’s options would be limited to fighting for survival while trying to keep his coalition together. An intense crackdown on the opposition, civil society, and business community is expected in this scenario. Economic consequences would be fatal, as the country comes again to a political standstill and the international community pressures for the regime to tumble. In his attempt to regroup forces, it opens the possibility for internal confrontation within the regime coalition as Maduro looks weak and incapable of sustaining the elite in power. 

It is in the opposition’s hands to develop the correct strategy that allows them to influence the moving pieces into the desirable positions, which we will find out on January 10 and the days that follow.

If Maduro manages to win enough time and marginalizes González Urrutia as he did with Guaidó while keeping his coalition together, the former will end up restoring normalcy, deteriorating the morale of the opposition and international pressures. González Urrutia could help regain initial momentum by giving the opposition the ability to dictate some terms. Expectation would be through the roof but without a coordinated plan to break the regime’s coalition, his presence alone will likely not be enough to overrun the regime. González Urrutia will be exposed to arrest or worse, and going back into exile after a failed re-entry could very well be the end of this adventure. How long can he survive in Venezuela as a free man while turning up the heat is key to make this a viable scenario for political change.

Scenario 3: High stakes, uncertain moves 

Scenario 3 in the bottom right corner of the grid is defined by plausibility, meaning that it is within the realm of possibilities but it lacks certainty. As González Urrutia is determined to arrive in Venezuela on the 10th to swear into power, this scenario entails that his arrival will not face major challenges from a regime that will crack under pressure. González Urrutia left Venezuela the 8th of September with the argument that it was critical for him to avoid imprisonment, given that abroad he could continue to serve his functions as the legitimate president-elect by coordinating the efforts to oust Maduro, while Machado continues to rally the people from within. Thus, this scenario is determined by the opposition’s preparation prior to January 10, which remains rather unknown and unpredictable.

Machado and González Urrutia have expressed confidence about whatever happens on January 10th. However, there is a vast amount of moving pieces that have to fall in the correct places to lead their charge to victory. As recently put by Cáceres and Morillo, Washington’s attitude plays an influential role. However, to this point what the White House might do in the middle of its change of guard remains enigmatic. Similar to the statements of the European Union, the pledges for full support are vast but the devil is in the lack of detail. Domestically, the challenge remains the same: breaking down the concrete wall that the regime coalition has built throughout the years.

In order to do so, the opposition must have been preparing a robust set of carrots (rewards) and sticks (penalties) that sway key internal allies of Maduro to turn against him. González Urrutia and Machado assert that they have the support of low-ranking officials and that their channels of communications with middle and high-ranking officials are open. However, there are no certainties of any negotiations taking place between the opposition and Maduro’s power players. It is in the opposition’s hands to develop the correct strategy that allows them to influence the moving pieces into the desirable positions, which we will find out on January 10 and the days that follow.

Moreover, this scenario will also have an immediate impact on the country’s day-to-day life. On one hand, González Urrutia and Machado’s preparedness to take on the government will mitigate any risks of rogue actors trying to disrupt this process. In a recent interview, González Urrutia hinted towards cabinet members already being chosen for a post-chavismo era. Will it include current members of Maduro’s elite? As for the chavista ruler and his allies,  a possibility is that they are caught by their own security forces that have changed sides. Another possibility is that in a previously agreed pact Maduro manages to flee, seeking refuge in Russia, sharing a bunk-bed with Bashar al Assad. Meanwhile, the high-ranking members of his elite that refused to pact with the opposition will scramble to not pay the maximum price while those who negotiated will ensure the survival of the PSUV as a political force.

Scenario 4: The regime’s rogue factor 

Given the determination both factions have shown to be sworn into power in the build up to January 10, the scenario on the bottom left corner of the grid seems to be very unlikely. Nonetheless, although very small, there is a possibility that rogue actors within the regime’s elite take advantage of the current power struggle between the regime and the opposition. Under this scenario, it is important to identify those who hold enough power to create a new coalition in hand with the military that swiftly replaces Maduro while maintaining the support of regional (Colombia and Brazil) and global (Russia and China) allies. 

However, this scenario is defined by the uncertainty of a weak state. Due to its lack of legitimacy, the new regime may be subject to multiple disputes for control and influence from foreign actors, prompting up risks of intense civil unrest and violence. As for the opposition, there would be attempts to sideline them and continue to use political prisoners as a bargaining chip to gain legitimacy. This scenario could drive the country into a new political stalemate and the opposition into the backfoot as the new regime attempts to stabilize.

The grid gives us four scenarios for January 10. However, there will be a January 11, January 12, and even a January 23rd. Regardless, Maduro would like for January 10 to be a make or break as he is, for now, holding a winning hand with the support of a coalition that, despite its visible cracks, still appears to be strong enough to withstand pressure. For the opposition, it is about what happens after that date, as the scenarios for political change are still viable after the 10th.

Therefore, next Friday is a milestone to ensure a sustainable path for political change. This will depend on the opposition’s long-term strategy to preserve its leadership, its adaptability and its capacity to exploit the inherent fragilities of the regime. This is a message that must be repeated, acknowledging the symbolic importance of the day but not defining it as the last chance. The regime has shown cracks where lie the opposition’s opportunity to break it apart. Therefore, it becomes a matter of what can be done internally to accelerate the implosion. What happens on the 10th and beyond will be crucial to maintain the momentum Maduro has built since the opposition primaries in 2023, and to add a full stop to chavismo’s weakest chapter.