Five months ago, we published an article outlining potential scenarios for the July 28 presidential election. What ultimately transpired aligned with Scenario 2: Chavismo stole the election by publishing forged results and simply declaring Maduro the winner through a cloudy statement from CNE president Elvis Amoroso, and then shutting down the electoral process with a tumbao of Perezjimenizmo. In this scenario, we anticipated that if the opposition had evidence to prove their victory (as they indeed did), María Corina Machado and the national leadership would rally the public to defend the results in the streets.

However, that call never came. People spontaneously protested, but in the days following July 28, the opposition leadership failed to mobilize a full-scale defense of the results. We see this as a strategic misstep, influenced partly by an overestimation of what could be achieved through negotiations mediated by Brazil and Colombia, as well as uncertainty about their ability to manage a new wave of street demonstrations across the country.

Without waiting for the opposition, Venezuelans took to the streets in the days after the election, blocking all entrances to Caracas and advancing to within 500 meters of Miraflores Palace.

Yet, without clear leadership or strategic goals during those critical hours, Maduro’s regime was able to regroup and convince security forces to repress the protests through incentives, such as introducing extortion mechanisms targeting detainees’ families—ushering in the era of the “Civic-Military-Police Union.”

By the time María Corina began formally calling for protests, chavismo had already reorganized and launched a fresh wave of repression. Fear took hold, and mobilizing efforts became increasingly difficult.

This is the situation as we approach the end of the year. Like July 28, January 10 is a date that people quietly anticipate everywhere. It’s common for small talk in supermarket lines, elevators, or bank queues to end with, “just one month to go.” But what Venezuelans expect from this date remains unclear. Both political factions remain steadfast in their positions: Nicolás Maduro and Edmundo González Urrutia each insist that they will be inaugurated on January 10. The questions of how and where generate the most speculation. Based on the potential stances of the involved actors, we’ve outlined a new set of scenarios for 2025.

Scenario 1: the return of the king

We don’t know how it would happen, nor do we presume to understand all the logistical challenges involved. But let’s imagine that on January 10—or in the days that follow—Edmundo González arrives in Caracas. The national response would likely be favorable because it would shatter the longstanding myth of the opposition politician forced into exile, where they become a spokesperson for democracy while being effectively neutralized on the domestic front. This raises questions about the motivations that would drive the government to allow his return and the benefits it might gain. The most apparent concession would likely involve negotiations over his safety. However, this would also require the regime to backtrack on the arrest warrant it issued against the opposition candidate—a reversal that could create complications, particularly in a time of heightened tension.

1a. Washington as the good cop

If Edmundo returns under circumstances shaped by a U.S. policy guided by oil industry lobbyists and holders of Venezuelan sovereign debt bonds, a negotiated settlement could emerge. In such a scenario, the U.S. might fund Venezuela’s “political normalcy” by lifting oil sanctions and easing some personal and family-related restrictions. Another factor motivating this scenario could be the Trump administration’s need to address the Venezuelan migration crisis—a highly publicized issue that resonates with the Republican base.

From Trump’s perspective, this would represent a dual victory: “We got rid of the Tren de Aragua from U.S. soil and secured oil without firing a single shot.”

In this context, Edmundo’s return would signal chavismo’s willingness to engage in negotiations with the United States. If this occurs, Edmundo, María Corina, and other leaders of the opposition coalition may find their actions constrained. They wouldn’t face imprisonment but would lack the capacity to pose a genuine threat to the ruling coalition. This scenario appears to be the most favorable outcome for the Maduro regime.

1b. Washington as the bad cop

If the United States adopts a more aggressive stance aimed at achieving a clear international victory, Maduro’s regime would face mounting pressures. These could range from increased bounties for information on officials wanted by U.S. authorities to new sanctions targeting Venezuela’s oil industry. There’s even the remote but not entirely implausible possibility of internal actions triggering a domino effect that could lead to Maduro’s downfall. Certain appointments in Trump’s administration—such as Mike Waltz, Marco Rubio, and Christopher Landau—are likely to favor this kind of hardline approach toward the Maduro government starting in 2025.

Recent events, like the fall of Bashar al-Assad, have caused some unease within chavismo, which finds itself increasingly isolated. Despite differences in context, it’s undeniable that support from Russia and other seemingly steadfast allies now appears more limited. In this scenario, it’s not inconceivable that some regime insiders might view a transition, with Edmundo already in Venezuelan territory, as their golden ticket to survival.

Scenario 2: anatomy of a bluff

The belief that Edmundo González will return to Venezuela for his inauguration isn’t merely speculation or rumor. Both he and María Corina Machado have stated in recent weeks that González will return to Caracas in the coming days. However, there is a possibility that this won’t happen and that the ambassador will remain in Madrid. This outcome could result from one of two distinct reasons: the first favors the government, while the second is the most volatile of all scenarios.

2a. The downfall of María Corina and Edmundo González

It’s possible that González Urrutia won’t return, particularly if the United States has opted for a moderate, negotiation-based approach with Maduro’s government while the latter refuses to offer any guarantees for González’s safe return. In the absence of such guarantees, international allies of the opposition could pressure him to remain in Spain. Without the support of a U.S. administration focused on normalizing relations with Maduro, it’s unlikely that Machado and the opposition would have the resources or organization to devise a new political strategy in the short term.

Given the high expectations that both González and Machado have generated in their recent communications, this could lead to significant frustration and disappointment among the public. Such discontent might further erode confidence in their leadership—a familiar pattern for opposition figures who have failed to deliver the change people desperately hope for.

2b. Strategic delay and conflict

If Edmundo González does not return and the Trump administration adopts a confrontational stance, it signals that there are no viable negotiation channels to ensure his safe arrival in Venezuela.

In this scenario, a collision course becomes inevitable: the U.S. might advise González to remain abroad while developing a new strategy, given the high likelihood that chavismo would use his arrest as a bargaining chip.

Supported by the U.S. and other international allies, the opposition might formulate a fresh strategy in the days leading up to January 10, on inauguration day itself, and in the weeks following. If confrontation prevails on both sides, chavismo would likely target the arrest or forced exile of Machado and her key operatives. The situation of the occupants of the Argentine embassy seem to hint in this direction.

Should Edmundo González fail to appear in Caracas in the coming days, close attention will need to be paid to the attitudes and actions of all parties involved. This will determine whether we are witnessing a moment dominated by doves or hawks.

The new year promises a potentially decisive turning point in our national history.

Happy 2025.