Caracas Chronicles

“The November electricity crisis is the worst one I can remember,” says Alberto, who has lived on Margarita Island since 2017. “The government announced eight hours of rationing, but the outages lasted 12 on average. There were times and places where people didn’t have power for 20 hours.”

“Ice began to be scarce, so there was no way to preserve food in the fridge either. I had to throw away all the food that was in the freezer,” says Corina, a 27-year-old woman. “Imagine having to clean, wash and cover your basic needs in just four hours.”

On November 11, an explosion at PDVSA’s Muscar Complex in Monagas, Venezuela’s main gas hub, exacerbated the precariousness of public services in Margarita and revived memories of the worst moments of the country’s economic crisis. In those days, heat and darkness consumed residents while the central government scrambled to restore the gas supply to the island’s thermoelectric plants.

Margarita is the main island of Nueva Esparta state, home to 98% of its population according to the most recent census (2011). The electrical grid of Coche, the other inhabited island of Nueva Esparta, is not covered in this report.

Testimonies shared on social media, in the independent press, and from locals contacted for this story show how communities endured the latest crisis by consuming less and less water and food, relying on neighbors’ solidarity and businesses forced to discard perishable goods, and waiting for updates on when electricity might return, even partially.

“Without official communication, you don’t know what’s happening or how long the emergency and heat will last, and that makes it harder to cope. It affects everything,” Alberto continues. “Schools can’t teach like this, people can’t sleep, and businesses can’t run.”

Several interviewees recalled the chaos of a comparable electrical emergency in 2022, when the pipeline supplying Margarita from Sucre state broke down. In 2021, the Nueva Esparta Chamber of Commerce (Camcomercione) pointed out that power outages and fluctuations stem from a lack of “structural solutions” to the problem. This latest crisis has once again raised critical issues for islanders: the private sector’s ability to mitigate outages, the vulnerability of tourism operators before and during peak seasons, and the state of Nueva Esparta’s energy infrastructure.

CORPOELEC’s footprint on the island

“More power generation? Margarita already has enough generation capacity,” remarked an expert consulted for this piece. “You used to have a storage system in Guamache fueled by diesel: you’d fill the tanks, and that’s how the plants worked. What happened to that fuel system? Why was the alternative system dismantled? That is what the authorities won’t explain.”

The expert refers to the Juan Bautista Arismendi Thermoelectric Plant in El Guamache, at the island’s southern tip. Designed to operate on dual fuel—natural gas from eastern Venezuela or diesel during maintenance or supply disruptions—it was meant to ensure reliability. Its counterpart, the Luisa Cáceres de Arismendi Power Plant in Porlamar, was built with the same dual functionality.

Currently, the thermoelectric plants’ dual system isn’t operational, and restoring it depends on “decisions from the top, the central government.” A source in Nueva Esparta’s hotel industry noted that the military, tasked with rationing and distributing diesel, had enough fuel in Margarita to keep the plants running if the dual system had been maintained.

CORPOELEC, the omnipotent overseer of Venezuelan electricity—service provider, operator, and developer—has been one of chavismo’s murkiest creations since its founding in 2007, when Hugo Chávez nationalized the industry. The state-owned company hasn’t published annual reports since 2013. According to an old BBC report, CORPOELEC’s last monthly bulletin was issued 15 years ago.

Investigating CORPOELEC’s operations in places like Margarita thus requires sifting through endless press notes in which officials blame sabotage or vandalism (Chávez started this narrative in 2010), applaud efforts to clear weeds from generation parks, or celebrate restoring some plant’s functionality—without specifying output levels. We don’t know how many turbines in the Juan Bautista or Luisa Cáceres parks are operational—or how much electricity they’ve generated since PDVSA restored Margarita’s gas supply on November 21.

In any case, this vulnerability seems absurd for an island with two thermoelectric plants and a submarine power cable whose installed capacity collectively doubles Margarita’s demand.

When the Chacopata-Margarita submarine cable was inaugurated in 2014, the chavista portal Aporrea noted its capacity was 230 MW, with potential output of up to 500 MW “with all machines running,” according to then-director Jesse Chacón. In 2014, a second 85 MW turbo generator was added to Juan Bautista’s four turbines, enabling it to produce 206 MW. Luisa Cáceres, with nine turbines, was designed to deliver at least 227 MW according to a 2001 Modern Power Systems report—likely the last maintenance contract General Electric signed with the expropriated Nueva Esparta Electric System (SENECA).

Open-source information shows Margarita’s installed capacity is at least 650–670 MW. Venezuelan electricity specialist José Aguilar estimates the infrastructure can generate up to 925 MW. Sources consulted for this piece say Margarita needs only 330 MW during low seasons and 350 MW during peak times, like December or the Virgin of the Valley festivities in September. With economic activity reduced and migration affecting the island, real demand may fall below those figures.

However, chavismo announced the return of Margarita’s electric service by reactivating the JBA-1 unit, one of the two “Juan Bautista” turbogenerators that offers 85 MW. After the blackout that affected 20 states of the country on August 30, journalist Dexcy Guédez pointed out that only “Juan Bautista” (theoretically with less capacity than its counterpart) supplied 50% of the island. Again, there is no clear information about the current generation of JBA-2, nor about “Luisa Cáceres” or the contribution of the submarine cable. According to El Estímulo, the two plants are producing only 188 MW, which is barely a fifth of the installed capacity according to Aguilar.

“When these plants were inaugurated, there was a conversation about the possibility of exporting electricity. That’s no longer happening,” said a guesthouse owner. “We’ve returned to a normal that isn’t normal: constant, permanent outages—not necessarily the chaos we just lived through with the total gas absence.”

‘Oppositions’ in La Asunción

Testimonies gathered for this report highlight the deep social discontent on Margarita Island, where local authorities strive to insulate Russian, Polish, and high-income Venezuelan tourists from the harsh realities faced by residents. For the average Margariteño, water shortages compound the impact of relentless power outages. Corina, a resident interviewed for this piece, claims that the Nueva Esparta government prioritizes sprucing up select streets and commercial zones to cater to tourists, while neglecting the island’s broader population.

“We don’t want investments like putting a Zara store in [prominent shopping mall] Sambil. Margarita residents want real development—something that improves basic services and daily life,” she says.

Corina also criticizes the lack of meaningful political representation. “I don’t feel represented by any politician in Nueva Esparta. The so-called ‘exemplary municipalities’ are a sham. There’s no effort to make the municipalities self-sufficient.”

Governor Morel Rodríguez, now serving his fifth term at 84, paints a very different picture. He recently declared Nueva Esparta “the best state in Venezuela,” asserting that residents maintain faith in tourism as the main source of employment.

However, a few interviewees argue that local politicians, including Rodríguez, have long avoided confronting the central government about its neglect. Since the 1990s, Nueva Esparta’s leaders have depended on resources funneled from Miraflores and have tread carefully to avoid offending Caracas. Rodríguez, elected under the Fuerza Vecinal banner—a party accused of splitting the opposition vote in the 2021 regional elections—has reportedly prioritized maintaining smooth relations with the government, while the latter has cracked down on opposition-controlled local governments.

This year, Rodríguez even called on citizens to vote for Maduro in the presidential elections, emphasizing the need for “respectful and cooperative” ties with the central government.

“We are three islands, and we have everything—except reliable services,” he told Bajo La Lupa recently. He claimed that the national government is working to resolve these issues, adding that Nueva Esparta boasts “enough water, the country’s second-best public safety, top-tier hotels, decontaminated beaches, and a population that believes in tourism as a pathway to employment.”

Yet this optimism rings hollow for many. Alfredo Díaz, Rodríguez’s predecessor, governed during one of the country’s most tumultuous periods (2017–2021), marked by political instability and a deepening humanitarian crisis. Díaz denounced chavista corruption for leaving Nueva Esparta’s infrastructure—electricity, drinking water, and sewage—on the brink of collapse.

On November 24, amid a spiraling electricity crisis, Díaz was arrested by the Maduro regime on a highway in Portuguesa, according to his daughter’s social media posts. Reports suggest Díaz had fled Margarita months earlier after being targeted in the post-election crackdown. Three days after his arrest, Diosdado Cabello accused Díaz of being the “leader of terrorist comanditos” in Margarita, alleging he was planning sabotage for December and January in collaboration with opposition leader María Corina Machado and exiled cop Iván Simonovis.

The necessary infrastructure

As Margarita braces for an uncertain holiday season, another chaotic episode, like those seen in July and August, seems to force the private sector to intervene with state officials to prevent further crises. While CORPOELEC claims the gas supply issues following the PDVSA explosion in Monagas have been “resolved” and that electricity for the island is secure through December, skepticism remains high.

“We can invite all holidaymakers to come,” said Colonel Carlos Salazar, General Manager of CORPOELEC for Nueva Esparta, after meeting with Camcomercione. The business union has been advocating for working groups where the public and private sectors can work together on sustainable solutions.

“We can’t just keep putting out fires,” said a local tourism operator. “We need to seriously consider alternative energy sources.”

Private sector representatives have expressed frustration with the island’s reliance on mainland energy and voiced cautious optimism about pursuing renewable energy initiatives. As a Special Economic Zone (SEZ), Margarita’s legal framework could provide tax incentives and attract foreign investment in green technologies. Samir Al Attrach, a former Venezuelan ambassador to the UAE and now head of the Nueva Esparta SEZ, has championed the idea of scaling up renewable energy projects to align with the Paris Agreement’s goals.

During the November power crisis, Governor Rodríguez publicly called on Vice President Delcy Rodríguez to explore the installation of solar panel farms on Margarita and Coche, citing a proposal from German Ambassador Volker Pellet. However, Miguel Lara, an engineer specializing in Venezuela’s electrical system, argues that existing infrastructure could be restored more efficiently and affordably than building new solar farms. The main components—the submarine cable opened in 2014, the gas pipeline, the thermal power plants—are all operational.

“Why not try to recover the generation that uses gas, something that is faster and cheaper than what the governor has proposed? Would the solar panels project be funded with his own money or the German government’s, or does he want the central government to fund it with public money from Venezuelans?” Lara wonders.

“Imagine you have four cars that run on gasoline, but they’re not working due to neglect. Is your solution to buy an electric car when you don’t have enough money?”

Lara pointed out that the submarine cable, set up in 2014, has the capacity to operate at 230 kV, but the Casanay-Chacopata line that feeds it functions at only 115 kV. Boosting the line’s capacity would maximize the cable’s potential and could be achieved relatively quickly and cost-effectively. Lara also emphasized the need to expand the Guri transmission system to relieve pressure on other regions.

“To get things working, you have to change the current management model,” emphasizes Lara. “CORPOELEC serves a political process that has not worked and will not work.”

The island remains precariously reliant on temporary fixes. Power has returned since PDVSA resumed gas deliveries to Margarita’s thermoelectric plants but reduced supply to petrochemical production at the Jose Complex, causing a severe shortage of household gas, according to Bloomberg. Meanwhile, oil production in northern Monagas—isolated since the Muscar explosion—is burning off associated gas at historic levels. Margarita will remain prone to outages if chronic maintenance and management failures at PDVSA and CORPOELEC are not addressed.

“There has to be a long-term solution,” says Alberto, a local resident. “I know we’ll have electricity this holiday season, but it’s fragile. One more explosion, and we’ll be in the dark again. That much is clear.”