Caracas Chronicles

All evidence unquestionably shows that Venezuela’s opposition candidate, Edmundo González, won the July 28th presidential elections by a landslide. Venezuela’s dictator, Nicolás Maduro, orchestrated an electoral fraud with ‘results’ that defy mathematics and statistics. Now, both González and Maduro are asserting themselves as rightful presidents for the 2025-2031 term, likely with plans of holding simultaneous inaugurations on January 10, 2025. 

The question that remains is whether the international community, particularly strong actors like the United States and the European Union, will grant González full diplomatic recognition as Venezuela’s legitimate president in January. Such policy will create, once again, a ‘dual presidency’ situation – much like what the world saw when Juan Guaidó was recognized as interim president in 2019. 

Indeed, it seems that history may repeat itself. Some Latin American leaders have already recognized González as president-elect and will likely grant full recognition in a few months. Argentina has already declared González “the legitimate winner and president-elect” of Venezuela. The European Parliament has gone even further and recognized González as “legitimate and democratically elected president.” Similar actions have been initiated by the U.S. Congress, including a resolution introduced by Donald Trump’s nominee for Secretary of State, Sen. Marco Rubio, “to recognize the duly-democratically elected president of Venezuela, Edmundo González.” The United States has already recognized González’s victory, suggesting his status as president-elect. In short, it seems recognition of opposition leaders without effective control as presidents—à la 20^th-century Wilsonian Doctrine of Recognition—will be the preferred tool to foster a democratic transition in Venezuela’s current crisis. On November 19th, current Secretary of State Antony Blinken tweeted that “the Venezuelan people” chose González as president elect. 

Will this time be different than in 2019? Proponents of recognizing González strongly believe so. The belief goes that recognizing González, even if he lacks control of Venezuela’s territory (he was forced to exile in Spain), will make Maduro’s inner circle succumb to pressure given González’s legitimacy from winning the elections, leading to a transition. The difference, it is said, lies in the clear popular legitimacy that González enjoys from winning the July 28 elections. As one senior U.S. diplomat recently put it: “The current juncture, however, is profoundly different. What happened in 2019 was about constitutional violations by the Maduro government; this time around, it’s about a blatant attempt to steal an election won by an opposition candidate,” concluding that “recognizing González as president-elect would radically shift the dynamic currently in play.”

International recognition of González as president, however, still remains unlikely to facilitate a transition simply because the key conditions for this policy to work are not present. 

My research on conflicts where two leaders declare themselves presidents between 2000 and 2021 shows that transitions are much more likely only when all great powers (U.S., EU, China, and Russia) agree to de-recognize the incumbent autocrat and uniformly recognize the opposition rival claiming legitimacy, even if lacking territorial control.

This already paints a really gloomy picture on the prospects for a recognition-driven transition in Venezuela. 

Let’s break this down. For context, there are precedents of transitions via international recognition of opposition leaders as presidents. For example, after Madagascar’s 2001 election, powerful autocrat Didier Ratsiraka refused to recognize his defeat, but he was forced to flee by his own loyalists immediately after the United States, France, China, and Russia consensually recognized opposition winner Marc Ravalomanana as president—even when he lacked effective control. Other examples of successful recognition-driven transitions include Côte d’Ivoire (2011), The Gambia (2016-17), or Guyana (2020).

But, in other cases, international recognition of opposition leaders as legitimate presidents has also failed to propel regime breakdown and leadership transitions. Guaidó’s 2019 presidency is one such disappointment, along similar attempts in Belarus (2020) and Myanmar (2021). In all three cases, the main factor preventing transitions was divided by great-power recognitions: Russia and China continued recognizing the illegitimate incumbents, while the United States and European states recognized opposition leaders as presidents. Under these conditions, no transitions occur.

Still, governments and pundits may be confident that “this time is different” and even great-power divisions won’t be able to prevent a transition. Regrettably, this is not true. The reason why recognition of opposition rivals fails has very little to do with legitimacy, sanctions, or regime strength. Rather, it has a lot to do with how great-power consensus moderates recognition’s effects and impacts the established regime and its internal unity. The explanation is twofold.

First, one way consensus among great powers facilitates successful transitions via recognition is because it astonishingly amplifies the material costs that are inflicted to the de-recognized government. When all great powers withdraw recognition from an incumbent and recognize an opposition rival, the latter earns all material and sovereign benefits associated with that recognition. For the de-recognized leader, there is no exit option, and regime loyalists observe such absolute material deprivation, incentivizing defections away from the regime and support for the opposition leader which all great powers chose to recognize.

Unfortunately, this will not be the case in Venezuela. Even if the United States and EU recognize González, granting him legitimate rights to access foreign assets or even request military interventions, Maduro and his government still retains those same sovereign benefits from Russian and Chinese recognitions, neutralizing any costs that could have been inflicted on his regime. The fact that regime elites—think of Padrino López, Diosdado Cabello, or los hermanos Rodríguez—profit increasingly from deals with these illiberal powers emphasizes even more the little effect that recognizing González will have on Maduro’s inner-circle. 

Second, great powers don’t make (de)recognition decisions lightly, as recognition is a costly, credible action from which backtracking is difficult. Recognizing a rival without effective control disrupts a state’s administrative, economic, and diplomatic relations, elevating the rival to a sovereign equal who can make demands. It also incurs reputational costs by deviating from the “effective control doctrine” in international law. As one scholar notes, such recognition is an “implicit commitment to regime change.” If not just one but all great powers were to de-recognize the incumbent, they send a powerful signal of commitment to regime change, enabling regime loyalists to coordinate defections toward a universally recognized opposition authority, fostering a transition. 

This, however, is not Venezuela’s case. Sure, the U.S. and European withdrawal of Maduro’s recognition signals a serious intent to remove him. But Russian and Chinese continued recognitions of Maduro serve as strong counter-signals, reassuring regime insiders that Maduro retains strong backing from other powers that are strongly committed to his survival. When junior officers in Caracas, Maracay, or Puerto Cabello consider defecting but hesitate due to major risks if others don’t follow, or when high-level officials in the judiciary or presidential palace weigh whether to side with González, Russia and China’s continued recognition strengthens Maduro’s position. Their recognition signals to regime insiders that defection could be costly since others might stay loyal, counting on the great powers’ support for the regime, and making coordination hard.

Thus, even if things are ‘different’ for Venezuela’s opposition and legitimacy, as long as China and Russia refuse to recognize González, regime elites have little incentive to defect, making the prospects for a transition minimal. 

Unless Western powers can somehow persuade Russia and China to withdraw recognition of Maduro—good luck with that—international recognition is likely to fail the same way it did with Guaidó’s presidency. Even more, de-recognition of Maduro will likely deepen his regime’s reliance on Russia and China as committed recognizers, further emboldening Maduro and company to cling to power at any cost.  

The takeaway is that recognizing González as president is unlikely to bring democratic change to Venezuela. However, as with all findings and inferences in political phenomena, my take comes with a caveat. Specifically, the policy’s effectiveness might depend on the commitment level and intensity of the United States. If they simply rely on this half-baked policy and expect major shifts in Venezuelan politics, then it will likely fail. Yet, if the United States shifts to a fully committed stance, there’s room for optimism. 

Thus, even if things are ‘different’ for Venezuela’s opposition and legitimacy, as long as China and Russia refuse to recognize González, regime elites have little incentive to defect, making the prospects for a transition minimal.

This could mean two things. On the one hand, the United States could not just recognize González but also fully, not partially, double-down against the Maduro regime. Particularly for the Trump administration and figures like Rubio, this means making the removal of Maduro by the end of the administration a serious first-order priority, ensuring that they work to guarantee that outcome via any measure possible. On the other hand, if the Trump administration isn’t prepared to guarantee Maduro’s ouster, refraining from recognizing González may be wiser. In this case, a diplomatic “long game” might yield better results—fully engaging in diplomacy, normalizing relations, and finding gradual solutions through such renewed leverage to influence Maduro. 

Whether recognition will be a useful policy to pursue will depend on the coherence and commitment of the Trump administration. What should be avoided is relying significantly on this policy as primary driver and sending mixed-signals or lacking the resolve to pursue it to the very finish line.