Caracas Chronicles

There’s a general feeling that Venezuelan politics have been paralyzed since the aftermath of the July 28 presidential election. Particularly after Edmundo González left to Spain and the opportunity for a defining transition-making moment seemed to dissipate. In part that is true. The Maduro regime is ruling through a combination of chaos, deniability and terror that make any form of political activity extremely dangerous, something reflected on the record number of arrests, peaking levels of police discretion, and opaque internal struggles.

We can also see that in individual cases like that of Edwin Santos, a social leader in Apure linked to opposition groups who disappeared and was found dead on a road two days later. We can’t confirm who took him and how he died—parties and human rights organizations point at different groups in the security apparatus based on second-hand information, yet we can only deduct that he was kidnapped by unidentified, hooded armed men and put inside a vehicle without plates. The contempt for life and truth displayed by official accounts—coming from the likes of CICPC chief Douglas Rico and Maduro propagandist Madelein García—is chilling, especially for those who live in the country’s most abandoned towns.

High profile political prisoners like Freddy Superlano were kidnapped in similar ways. Ordinary Venezuelan citizens are prone to enforced disappearances if they encounter a police agent that cares to look for a single trace of dissent in their phone messaging apps. Just a text with “Edmundo presidente” or “hasta el final” can make you end up in a cell and force a family to pay an expensive ransom. Anyone who contributed in some way to Maduro’s defeat on July 28 now obeys a logic of survival—this of course includes María Corina Machado and those members of her coalition that haven’t been silenced or arrested.

The trauma produced by the aftermath of July 28 is very much alive, and won’t wane any time soon. That being the case, it is a reasonable cause for paralysis, unlike waiting for the results of the presidential election in the U.S. and any policy announcement that may come after that.

The democratic leadership shouldn’t wait for either Harris or Trump to set the tone, also because Venezuela won’t be a foreign policy priority for the Americans.

Waiting for a Donald Trump or a Kamala Harris administration to define the way forward with Venezuela carries significant risks.

If Harris wins, we could be set for a delayed reaction (perhaps stemming from a contested U.S. election result and political instability) or inaction to some extent, if we assume that she wouldn’t depart from Biden’s flexible sanctions regime and rely on worn-out mediators like Colombia and Brazil. Now, Petro and Lula are not exactly trusted (or vice versa) by neither Maduro nor Trump.

Trump has a cable pelao’ with Maduro, the man he couldn’t bring down five years ago. Now, the former’s rhetoric about Venezuela paints the picture of a safe, malandro-free country that deliberately exports criminals to U.S. cities. Striking a deal with Maduro—who also demonizes Venezuelans abroad and, like Trump, repeatedly links them to the Tren de Aragua—seems like a possibility if they both agree that Venezuela needs “peace and stability” to be great again. Us Venezuelans know about that sort of peace. We will see if figures like Richard Grennell (the man being tipped to become Secretary of State should Trump win the White House) or Marco Rubio are bold enough to compromise with Maduro in the face of Latino voters that transformed Florida into a red state.

We agree with James Bosworth (or Boz, who writes about political risk in Latin America). A scenario where Trump and his associates directly deal with Maduro can undermine the opposition who beat chavismo on July 28 and dismiss the country’s pressing problems.

Waiting for a Donald Trump or a Kamala Harris administration to define the way forward with Venezuela carries significant risks.

The democratic leadership shouldn’t wait for either Harris or Trump to set the tone, also because Venezuela won’t be a foreign policy priority for the Americans.

Instead, domestic actors who voice their concerns every time they can should be at the forefront of any conversation about Venezuelan politics. Decision-making lags and inattention are fatal to them.

Venezuelan pensioners who receive around $33.5 a month in state assistance need answers as soon as possible. Essential personnel like teachers and health workers, who try to survive amidst neglect and increasing surveillance, are suffocated by the political stalemate. In the private sector, local food producers have made it clear that they can’t guarantee long term provision while being paid in depreciating bolívares. The population that kissed the ballot on July 28 and rebelled the next day to kick Maduro out is largely concentrated in places where food insecurity, police brutality, absent waste collection services, and daily blackouts make life miserable.

Many millions in those sectors know a thing or two about being a migrant in Latin America and would rather stay poor with Maduro at home. The regime despises them more than anyone. Unfortunately, existing and potential agents of change can’t afford to ignore them while chavismo fully retains power. ¿Qué hacer?

This year, the pro-democracy movement led by Machado achieved something that was unthinkable three years prior, when there wasn’t a national consensus about the galvanizing potential of an election campaign in an authoritarian country like ours. Machado’s reversal from a skeptical and isolated posture is no miracle, but proof of the opposition’s ability to reinvent itself when it successfully grasps the people’s mood and grievances. A similar rethink will be necessary for the upcoming months and years, or chavismo’s impoverishing efforts will consume the last vestiges of democracy.