Caracas Chronicles

After its victory on July 28, the Venezuelan opposition seems trapped in a labyrinth with no way out. Having won the presidential elections, gathering the evidence to prove it and the support of nearly the entire international community, the democratic leadership is unable to enforce its victory. Moreover, the dictatorship forced Edmundo González, the replacement candidate from whom Nicolás Maduro stole the election, into exile through blackmail and threats. Opposition leader María Corina Machado is in hiding, increasingly isolated, and restricted in her movements by the straitjacket of repression.

The reason the opposition has been unable to materialize its triumph is simple: it has the votes, not the weapons. As long as the regime remains united and continues to crush any manifestation of discontent, its opponents will have few options to push for change.

The opposition faces an additional challenge: the loss of confidence within its own ranks. If it fails to achieve significant goals in the coming months, frustration will grow, and the population, as it often occurs, will start blaming political leaders for failing to oust Maduro. Over time, it will become more difficult to avoid divisions, fight discouragement, and maintain the attention of the international community.

On the other side, one feature of the regime that threatens its own cohesion is the cloud of suspicion that surrounds the relationships between its leaders and factions. Chavistas feel threatened by internal enemies as much as by external ones. They keep an eye over one another, fearful that a powerful actor or group might decide to sideline them, sending them to the regime’s dungeons, as has happened to more than one military officer.

Recognizing this vulnerability broadens the opposition’s scope of action. So far, the approach has been like that of a nutcracker: applying pressure on the government to break it. However, the possibility of turning the regime’s criminal nature against itself—by encouraging internal conflict and seeking ways to deepen its divisions—has not been sufficiently explored. 

Maintaining mobilization amid repression

Since the regime committed electoral fraud, the opposition has called for several marches to demand that Maduro respect the true result. It’s a rational strategy, as peaceful protest is one of the few pressure tools available.

The problem is that, under the current circumstances, protesting is dangerous. Chavismo had never repressed with such intensity as it has since July 28. At least 25 people have been killed and around 1,700 arrested according to Foro Penal, including more than a hundred children and teenagers. Some detainees have suffered electric shocks, sexual abuse, cold-water immersion, and suffocation with plastic bags. Through this brutal campaign, Maduro has managed to instill fear in the population, shrinking the size of the protests.

The reason the opposition has been unable to materialize its triumph is simple: it has the votes, not the weapons. As long as the regime remains united and continues to crush any manifestation of discontent, its opponents will have few options to push for change.

It’s admirable that, despite the repression, many Venezuelans continue to stand up for their rights in the streets, fully aware that such civic action could land them in jails or torture centers. However, it’s unrealistic to expect everyone to always act heroically, especially when there’s no certainty that those sacrifices will bear fruit.

For the opposition leadership, each decision has become a heartbreaking dilemma. The regime shows daily that it doesn’t care about imprisoning and torturing innocent people to hold onto power. María Corina Machado, however, is deeply affected by the suffering of those who join her fight. This is why she has been forced to space out the protests, call them in the mornings, and do everything possible to reduce the risks faced by protesters. The empathy gap between the dictatorship and her limits her ability to act.

Thus, the opposition finds itself trapped: it doesn’t have many tools beyond street pressure, but increasing this pressure brings a substantial rise in detentions. This, in turn, creates a collective fear that restricts its ability to mobilize.

Money and fear

There’s another issue beyond the challenge of maintaining mobilization amid repression: it’s not easy to provoke a split within the regime. This is evidenced by the fact that no such fracture has occurred since the colossal fraud of July 28 and the international recognition of the opposition’s victory. One great paradox of chavismo is how a government so incompetent in many areas has been so effective in preventing internal rebellions.

Part of that explanation lies in the fact that, like Maduro, the military high command and security chiefs fear being punished for the crimes they’ve committed under the dictatorship. The United States has sanctioned and accused many of them, including Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López, of drug trafficking and other offenses. The International Crime Court is conducting investigations into crimes against humanity attributed to the regime. Surrendering power would mean facing too high a risk.

Another obstacle is that both Maduro and Hugo Chávez before him restructured the Armed Forces and security services. Once-vertical command structures were replaced with a decentralized and less hierarchical system that spreads power among a large number of generals. The result? Overthrowing the dictator requires the collaboration and coordination of many actors.

Added to this is an intelligence apparatus that permeates the entire military to quickly detect and crush any uprising or sign of dissent, as well as a clientelist network that rewards loyal security officials with lucrative business opportunities in both legal and illicit sectors of the economy, including the oil industry, mining, food imports, smuggling, and drug trafficking.

Money and fear largely constitute the formula for keeping the regime cohesive.

A possible avenue of action

Inventor Charles Kettering once said something with a good dose of truth: “A problem well-stated is half-solved.” The main challenge for the opposition now is that Maduro neutralized street demonstrations as a tool of pressure. Are there other ways to cause a rupture?

Inside the regime, no one trusts even their own shadow. Its leaders know they are part of a clique of disloyal and unscrupulous criminals, a group held together not by emotional bonds, a noble cause, or an ideology, but by the conviction that each member’s personal survival depends on the survival of the regime.

Money and fear largely constitute the formula for keeping the regime cohesive.

This climate of distrust is a vulnerability that the opposition and the international community, especially the United States, could exploit. In theory, it shouldn’t be difficult to fragment a group of individuals who think the worst of each other and tend to interpret even the most innocent gestures as signs of a conspiracy. Personal sanctions, for example, shouldn’t focus on punishing but on dividing. The bounties for the capture of the regime’s leaders could be reformulated to be more effective in tempting and encouraging potential traitors. Foreign intelligence agencies could also release sensitive information for the same divisive purpose.

It’s possible to imagine a scenario where an influential chavista, in the midst of an internal struggle that threatens to bring them down, begins to see a transition process as a better option than ending up like Tareck El Aissami, the powerful former chavista minister who Maduro arrested and jailed last year. If a government leader perceives a tangible risk of falling in disgrace and suddenly feels subjected to the will of criminals whose cruelty they know firsthand, wouldn’t the possibility of collaborating with the opposition to promote change become more appealing? A transition, with all its inherent uncertainty, could become their only way to survive.

In the end, the fracture might not occur due to external pressure but through faction-led rebellions within the regime, with enough resources to avoid being crushed. This could help align incentives between key actors on both sides, facilitating a democratization process.

The risk of division and discouragement

It was predictable that the regime would not accept its defeat and would do everything possible to entrench. The opposition has no choice but to accept the new challenges, adapt to the new scenario, and find new ways to continue weakening Maduro.

However, as important as it is to innovate in the search for solutions, it is equally vital to avoid counterproductive attitudes. The consummation of the fraud has generated enormous disappointment. A very human instinct is to vent that frustration by blaming the opposition leadership for not reaching the ultimate goal. This reaction is not only self-destructive but also unfair, as it overestimates these politicians’ power to bring about change while minimizing both their courage and their achievements. We must also remember the difficulty of fighting from clandestinity. We cannot be intolerant of the mistakes of leaders who now face unimaginable pressures.

When María Corina Machado is criticized for not having fulfilled her promise to “cash in” the electoral victory, what is really being reproached is her lack of a formula for overthrowing a tyranny. The reality is that no one has that formula: not her, not us, not the scholars who specialize in the subject.

At a recent event at Georgetown University, political science professor Javier Corrales stated that his field still doesn’t know how to trigger transitions to democracy. This admission struck me as frank, coming from an academic who has dedicated his career to studying democratic backsliding and democratization.

When María Corina Machado is criticized for not having fulfilled her promise to “cash in” the electoral victory, what is really being reproached is her lack of a formula for overthrowing a tyranny. The reality is that no one has that formula: not her, not us, not the scholars who specialize in the subject.

At the end of July, the Venezuelan opposition achieved what few democratic movements have: they defeated a dictator at the polls and gathered irrefutable evidence of their victory. They showed the world that, even under the most oppressive systems, much can always be done to increase the chances of a transition to democracy. That feat required tenacity, creativity, optimism, and a mindset open enough to seek opportunities, and detect opportunities where almost no one else saw them. That is the path on which they must continue moving forward.