Caracas Chronicles

The European Union’s last informal meeting of Foreign Ministers took place in Brussels on August 29. Amid a packed agenda marked by two wars of vital importance to Europe, the post-electoral crisis in Venezuela was also addressed. 

It was anticipated that the EU countries would use this Foreign Ministers’ meeting to send clear signals of support for the sovereign expression of the Venezuelan people. It was expected that the Member States of the European Union would support the Venezuelan people’s desire for change, expressed in the July 28 presidential election and confirmed by the official voting tallies disclosed by María Corina Machado’s Campaign Command.

Yet, the statement fell short, merely stating that Maduro did not win the elections. For member states and for Josep Borrell, the EU’s top diplomat, no actas means Maduro’s “win” can’t be verified now and likely never will. But nothing was said about Edmundo González, despite the evidence gathered by the opposition and rebukes from the Carter Center and UN experts, suggesting that Edmundo González won well.

The European Ministers dismissed the TSJ’s sham ruling, but refused to acknowledge the victory of Edmundo González and took no further action. Borrell said there was time until January 10 when the official transfer of power is expected to take place. He then hinted that the game wasn’t over in Venezuela, but wasn’t entirely clear about what the EU is willing to do to support democratization in Venezuela.

In addition, Spain’s involvement in González’s departure to Madrid subject to an asylum request—an operation that removed the president-elect from national soil ahead of the January 10 inauguration—has led to the first defeat of transition advocates in the international community.

Such a move contrasts with the unequivocal commitment expressed by the European Union to Bernardo Arévalo’s victory a year ago.

Against the pact of the corrupt

The achievements of Arévalo in the 2023 general elections was an exceptional disruption to Guatemalan politics, with some similarities with the events that resulted in González’s landslide win and the brutal reaction of the Maduro regime. 

Arévalo was a largely unknown lawmaker, sociology professor and diplomat. He is also the son of the country‘s first democratically elected president. In 2023, Arévalo suddenly emerged as the front figure of a pro-democracy movement that has countered the deeply rooted remnants of Guatemala’s autocratic era that have dominated Guatemalan politics for decades: a mesh of predatory elites and bureaucrats (notably in judicial institutions) known as “the pact of the corrupt,” which rule in similar ways to the Chavista state. 

The reaction went on as international actors were more and more concerned about the precedent Guatemala’s electoral crisis could set in other countries.

A militant in the center-left Movimiento Semilla, Arévalo was allowed to run after at least three opposition candidates more prominent than him were disqualified by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal or TSE. He had scant chances according to voter intention polls, and unexpectedly got the second spot on the June 23^rd vote before heading to a runoff against establishment candidate Sandra Torres. Besides smear campaigns, threats, persecutions, and an acute deterioration of political and civic space, the ruling party and business elites colluded against Arévalo in an effort to ban him and his running mate.  Guatemala’s attorney general and the special prosecutor in the Public Ministry intimidated electoral staff, candidates, judges and polling station volunteers.

Nevertheless, Arévalo won with 60% of the vote. But the aggressions that followed made the rightful transfer of power (and the popular effort to support it) seem very uphill. Seizing the six-month window before Arévalo’s inauguration, police forces raided the offices and storage facilities of the TSE, and the Special Prosecutor Against Impunity confiscated electoral registers. More than 125 documents and original records of the general elections were illegally taken in broad daylight while filmed by opposition and media. The TSE delayed the publication of results for several days before certifying Arévalo’s victory. In response, the chief prosecutor initiated legal actions against TSE magistrates to strip their immunity.

External pressures

All actions to prevent the recognition of Arévalo as president-elect were driven by the outgoing President Alejandro Giammattei. This was met by an immediate, coordinated rejection from the international community, who characterized the situation as an attempted coup—a term that the Europeans have not yet used for Maduro, though Borrell did call him de facto president to imply it, before backpedaling and amending it to the inapplicable term “ad. interim president”. 

The reaction went on as international actors were more and more concerned about the precedent Guatemala’s electoral crisis could set in other countries. 

This is what the US Ambassador to the OAS warned in this organization’s permanent council. They feared there would be no transition of power in accordance with the will of the majority, and witnessed an escalation in the violation of human rights that could lead to a civil strife. 

With these assumptions in mind, both the US and the EU led a direct action to protect the drifting democracy and the election results. 

In the following months, the OAS, the US, Canada, the EU, and diplomatic corps from other Western states—along with senior representatives of multilateral and regional bodies—exerted pressure at different levels and fronts: on the electoral body, the attorney general’s office, the judiciary, and to the outgoing President Giammattei himself. 

The support of electoral experts did not end when the observers left the country; on the contrary, they remained steadfast in defending and safeguarding the results against the ploys of the Attorney General’s Office, actions to outlaw Arévalo’s party, disqualify the candidate, and revoke his immunity as president-elect.

High level Officials such as High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk, OAS Secretary General, Luis Almagro, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, and notably Josep Borrell traveled to Guatemala to show their unconditional support to the elected Bernardo Arévalo. In a “diplomacy at its best” showcase, we saw statements, press briefings with national and international media, together with public appearances in events purposely organized for Arévalo, combined with good-offices closed doors meetings to demand respect for the results. They warned about the political, financial and possibly legal consequences of maintaining an unruly position, but also showed commitment to mediate with radical spoilers of a potential transition.

In this sense, we saw Blinken meet with president-elect Arévalo and convey the American support for Guatemala’s peaceful political transition. Volker Türk too went on an official visit to Guatemala, attending events with Arévalo, taking formal and informal pictures with him. He also spoke with all sides in an effort to find common grounds.

As for the EU, the European Observation Mission together with that of the OAS debunked false allegations of fraud and attacks on electoral integrity. 

The support of electoral experts did not end when the observers left the country; on the contrary, they remained steadfast in defending and safeguarding the results against the ploys of the Attorney General’s Office, actions to outlaw Arévalo’s party, disqualify the candidate, and revoke his immunity as president-elect.

The EU also condemned the legislature’s actions to sabotage the presidential swearing in. Additionally, Josep Borrell indicated that if the election results were not accepted, EU-Guatemala relations would be severely affected, hinting at potential diplomatic, commercial, and even unilateral restrictive measures. The EU is not only an important trading partner for Guatemala, but Guatemala also benefits from numerous European technical and financial cooperation agreements.

In this context, in December 2023, the Council of Foreign Ministers adopted visa and entry restrictions to European territory, asset freezes, and individual sanctions against officials who attempted to undermine the electoral process and its outcome.

The European Parliament, for its part, adopted resolutions condemning violations of human rights as well as the wave of repression and persecution against the media, journalists, lawyers, and human rights defenders, resulting in violations of the civic and political space, while instructing the European External Action Service to maintain concrete actions of pressure and sanction.

Finally, in January, Borrell attended Arévalo’s tumultuous inauguration to show his support. While in Guatemala, he offered a package of assistance to strengthen the partnership and dialogue between the EU and Guatemala in areas of mutual interest, including governance, the rule of law, and inclusive and sustainable development.

A European buildup to January 10?

This successful chapter of restoring the rule of law offers insights into what could be done in the current Venezuelan crisis through a process of sustained and incremental pressure.

It could also serve as a roadmap to overcome the current lukewarm response, which is likely to be conditioned by two main reasons: first, Venezuela is a crime-based almost impenetrable autocracy, whilst Guatemala a very imperfect democracy; and second, Venezuela is a much more geopolitically strategic country than Guatemala. Undeniably, there are evident interests in Venezuelan oil and gas amid the current war in Ukraine and the escalation in the Middle East, which has further exacerbated the already precarious global supply of hydrocarbons and food. As a result, in July 2023, the European Union signed an agreement with the Maduro government during the EU-CELAC meeting to liquefy Venezuelan gas and export it to Europe. Aside from ensuring a supply that replaces Russia’s gas, and guaranteeing winter heating for European citizens, this agreement would benefit the likes of Eni, Repsol, and Maurel & Prom. 

Moreover, the restorative experience of the will of the Guatemalan people and the coordinated effort carried out by foreign actors should serve as a foundation in all coordinations with Latin American countries, particularly with Brazil, Europe’s main partner in the region. 

This would help prevent any of the Twenty-Seven from blindly accepting an intervention from this country, and others like Colombia and Mexico —also ideologically close to Maduro—without the proper criteria scrutiny.

As said, in spite of the challenges, the Guatemalan case is adaptable to Venezuela. Maduro’s theft of the presidential election, the intimidation, persecution and barring of political candidates; the deterioration of civil and political rights, the violation of all human rights and deletion of the rule of law, remind us all too well of the concerns set by the Guatemalan precedent in the region.

Moreover, the restorative experience of the will of the Guatemalan people and the coordinated effort carried out by foreign actors should serve as a foundation in all coordinations with Latin American countries, particularly with Brazil, Europe’s main partner in the region.

The European Union should, therefore, go back to its toolbox and apply the same forcefulness to protect democratic institutions and electoral processes in Venezuela as it did in Guatemala, or in any part of the world for that matter. Not only does it contribute to global peace and stability, but it also brings economic benefits to both the incumbent country and the Europeans.

The European Union’s approach to Maduro’s election fraud raises several critical questions that require immediate reflection. Unlike its proactive mediation in Guatemala, where Europe and the United States directly intervened to expose fraudulent narratives and sanction those in power, in the case of Venezuela, the response has been passive, relying purely on formal statements and lukewarm efforts by Brazil and Colombia. Given that the reports published by the UN and the Carter Center considered official information provided by the Venezuelan opposition as legitimate, the EU electoral experts could have therefore further verified it, adding legitimacy to the election results. 

Will Europe simply dismiss the situation and wait for any outcome after the US elections or New Year? Are they prepared to freeze assets, impose new sanctions, send special envoys, or revoke licenses from companies like Eni, Repsol and Maurel & Prom to signal that rapprochement is no longer on the table? And what role could further play the European diplomatic corps in Caracas in supporting the Venezuelan people, particularly now that Europe hosts President-elect González and shares responsibility for safeguarding his security and his rights? These are the pressing questions that should shape the EU’s policy going forward.