Caracas Chronicles

For some Venezuela-watchers, the international community may hold the key to a peaceful transition of power in Venezuela. They are paying attention, more specifically, to close chavista allies like Colombia/Brazil/Mexico, complicated powerhouses like China and Russia, and Democratic states like the U.S., Canada and those of Western Europe. 

Here’s a useful tool that a nerd in a basement came up with to see which country has said what on the results of the elections, click around and play with it:

One week after what millions of people, the opposition, and some foreign governments see as a landslide victory for Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia, there are some important pronouncements and some intriguing silences. 

Governments that have recognized Nicolás Maduro

Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bolivia, China, Cuba, Djibouti, Dominica, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Iran, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Qatar, Russia, Sudan, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Syria, Vietnam.

You’ll note four main groups (two of which overlap): chavista allies such as Russia, China and Cuba, left-wing dictatorships and/or military regimes such as Nicaragua, and Guinea-Bissau (these two groups overlap), and Caribbean islands whose support was gained by Hugo Chávez through Petrocaribe, like Dominica and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.

Governments that have recognized Edmundo González

Argentina, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay.

Governments that are asking for the full vote count and tallies

There are 193 UN Member States, two non-member States, and a handful of disputed states. Around 40 have recognized Maduro, and six have recognized González. That leaves around 150 countries in between, most of which have made no statement.

Among the governments that have asked for the full vote count (and not yet recognized either candidate as President Elect) are: Canada, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador (Nayib Bukele called fraud, but hasn’t officially recognized González), Germany, Guatemala, Guyana, the Holy See, Italy, Japan, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. 

Most importantly among this list: the U.S. (very vocal about their support for Gonzalez but still short of calling him president elect), Brazil, Colombia and Mexico.

Governments that have made no statement

Most of Africa and most of Asia. Notable silences: Turkey, India and South Africa.

Honorable Mentions: OAS, EU and the Carter Center

The Organization of American States held an emergency Permanent Council meeting where they failed -by one vote and with no votes against- to pass a resolution asking for the full vote count. Notably, Brazil and Colombia abstained and Mexico was absent.

OAS Secretary General Luis Almagro, however, fully denounced electoral fraud and said he’d ask the International Criminal Court to set a warrant for Maduro, for human rights violations following the elections.

The European Union, and later France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Poland and Portugal, have released statements asking for the full vote count. On August 4, the EU High Representative went further with a statement saying that “Copies of the electoral voting records published by the opposition, and reviewed by several independent organisations, indicate that Edmundo González Urrutia would appear to be the winner of the Presidential elections by a significant majority. The European Union thus calls for further independent verification of the electoral records, if possible by an internationally reputed entity.”

While the Carter Center isn’t a government or international organization, it was the main credible international observer allowed by Chavismo and even praised by Defense minister Vladimir Padrino López. They postponed their initial report, withdrew their personnel from the country and, once they were outside Venezuela, published a report where they stated the elections were not democratic and the results were not credible.

Some Key Responses

• United States: The Biden administration has been more lenient towards Chavismo than Trump was, which some argue is one of the incentives that allowed the election to happen. The Venezuelan problem is important to the United States, for migratory and, perhaps more importantly, drug trafficking reasons. The United States has made no secret of their wanting for a Democratic government in Venezuela, so it was to be expected that they’d denounce the electoral fraud. Their recognition of Edmundo González is welcome by the opposition, but was poorly received by the Brazil-Colombia-Mexico axis, which would arguably prefer a more low-pressure scenario.
• Russia and China: Russia and China are two of Chavismo’s main allies, political advocates and financiers. They’re also less than interested in democracy, and more than happy to antagonize the United States. It was expected that they’d quickly recognize Maduro no matter what, and it’d probably be difficult, were a transition to Democracy occur, to build strong ties between them and a new Venezuelan government. 

• Turkey: Call us crazy, but we think it’s noteworthy that Turkey, a less-than-democratic close ally of Chavismo, has been so quiet. Were a democratic transition to occur, it’d likely include amnesty and safe passage for top-ranking government officers (Maduro foremost among them) so they could live safely somewhere other than Venezuela. Among the top options for that would be Turkey. 

• Brazil, Colombia, Mexico: Perhaps the most important international players as of today. While the three governments (and presidents) are different, they share a “Latin American Left” ideology and leadership, and each has its own ties and incentives, both for the survival of the Maduro regime and for a democratic transition.
  • Brazil’s Lula was a founder of the Foro de Sao Paulo and a close ally of Chávez. He’s said to aspire to a clearer regional leadership. He’s told Maduro to go the democratic way (for whatever that’s worth). A democratic transition would benefit him insofar as it’d ease the migratory crisis, possibly lead to better commercial relations, and because the current state of affairs makes the Left look bad. But he also stands to lose from the fall of Chavismo, notably in the possible reopening of Odebrecht corruption investigations.
  • Mexico’s Lopez Obrador is, perhaps, the most ideological of the three. He’s been a clear defender of Chavismo. He wants the Left to succeed. But his country has also been affected by the Venezuelan migratory crisis. He’s likely the weakest link in the equation.
  • Colombia’s Gustavo Petro is probably the key actor right now. He’s a close ally of Chavismo and a well-known Leftist. He counts on Nicolás Maduro as a mediator with the Ejército de Liberación Nacional. He’s got a lot to lose from the fall of Chavismo. But, at the same time, he’s got a lot to gain from a democratic transition. The Venezuelan migratory crisis has affected Colombia harshly. Once one of their top commercial allies, now we barely register in their GDP. He also seems to be one of the only people in the world that Maduro listens to.

All in all, the three are likely to be very cautious, exercise little pressure, and handle the situation with the utmost diplomacy. In the final analysis, they might have more to gain from a Democratic transition than they have to lose from the fall of Chavismo. 

So… what can they do?

While many Venezuelans have dreams of Navy Seals and Blue Helmets… That’s not going to happen.

What can happen, though, is a game of incentives.

It looks like this: for Maduro et al, the cost of leaving power right now would be very, very high. They’d lose not only their political power but their main sources of income, most of their lifestyle, and they’d be actively pursued as criminals both within Venezuela and throughout a large part of the world. Staying in power might also be very hard and very costly (have you seen their faces this week?), but it seems like a matter of survival.

This is where negotiation, transitional justice and diplomacy come into play. What the international community, specially Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, countries like Turkey and the Emirates, the European Union and, perhaps most importantly, the United States can do is work with incentives. Make leaving power more attractive and less costly and staying in power less attractive and more costly. Remove or strengthen individual sanctions. Offer amnesty and safe passage. In short, negotiate.

Is it fair? Probably not. Will everyone like it? Not a chance. Will it work? Only one way to find out.