Caracas Chronicles

This article was originally published in Spanish by Runrunes

No bloodbath, no civil war. Some things have changed in Venezuela. One of them is that the Venezuelan State has been losing its monopoly on violence.

In recent years, the mass migration of almost 8 million people has not only left fathers and mothers without children, but it has also changed the configuration of violence and crime in the country and has dragged hundreds of officials from the security forces to flee in search of a better future.

Although there are no scientific or academic explanations, nor government policies that justify what happened, there is no doubt that the country today is safer and less violent than 10 years ago, or even 20 years ago. With fewer weapons on the streets or in the hands of civilians; with fewer common crimes; with fewer colectivos and bands; without political polarization and with a tendency to reduce police lethality.

In this context, the threat or forecast of a possible bloodbath or the outbreak of an eventual armed conflict does not seem to have any basis.

A less violent society

2023 was the least violent year in the last 25 years in Venezuela. It closed with a rate of 26.8 violent deaths (police intervention, deaths under investigation and homicides) per 100 thousand inhabitants, with 6,973 cases according to the Venezuelan Observatory of Violence (OVV).

That is the lowest number of homicides in the country since 1999, when 5,868 cases were registered, with a rate of 24.28 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, according to unofficial data from the Scientific, Penal and Criminal Investigations Corps (CICPC).

The reduction in the homicide rate and crimes in general – although there are no official figures – is evident in daily life. There is a decrease in robberies and reports of kidnappings have almost disappeared. Especially, compared to years in which more than 500 kidnappings were recorded, such as 2012, when homicides had a first historical peak with 19,126 reported cases.

This moment is also very different from 2016, the most violent year in the recent history of Venezuela with 23,449 homicides, according to a report prepared by Amnesty International and Reacin in 2018. According to OVV data the number would be 28,479 violent deaths, with a rate of 91.8 per 100 thousand inhabitants.

Venezuela is today a less violent society, showing a very different scenario than 2014, 2017 or 2019. For that reason, this is one of the factors that limits the possibility of a “bloodbath” during or after the electoral process.

Fewer police and military

Sitting on a Copa flight bound for Caracas, a dark, burly, tall man of about 35 stands out. His name is Francisco and he says he was a Sebin official. “I’m living in Chile, I already got my papers there,” he commented. He returned to Venezuela after six years, but not to stay. “I came to see my family and fix my passport to go to Spain,” he concluded.

Like him, others left their institutions: Leo, a PNB official who went to the United States in 2019; Juan Carlos, a CICPC commissioner, who requested asylum in the same country in 2020; Pedro, a former FAES agent, who arrived in Panama in 2018 and dozens of Venezuelan soldiers who are scattered around the world.

Although there are no numbers or official data, the strength of the police forces has been significantly reduced. The police and the military are also part of the Venezuelan diaspora. In 2019, a group of experts carrying out a diagnosis of the situation of citizen security in the country identified that there was a 50% deficit in the number of police officers needed to guarantee citizen security in the country.

Furthermore, the complaints of the officers themselves warned, in the critical years of violence, about a decrease in firepower and the limited access to ammunition that their security forces had. They even referred to the fact that criminal groups were better armed than them.

While it is true that, especially since 2014, Venezuelans have been victims of serious episodes of repression, human rights violations and an impressive deployment of equipment used to control public order by security forces, this context today also has changed.

The reports of the UN Fact-Finding Mission and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, which confirm the human rights violations and expose the possible crimes against humanity committed by officers of the security forces of the Venezuelan State, have had an impact on police and military.

For example, cases of police lethality involving more than 20,000 victims of alleged extrajudicial executions between 2015 and 2019, although they continue to occur, have been progressively reduced. Many officers at this time are aware that responsibility for these crimes is individual and does not prescribe, so they are not willing to sacrifice their freedom by getting involved in acts of repression that involve the commission of this type of crimes.

Another striking fact is that the anti-riot units, tear gas bombs and pellets, as well as officers dressed in Robocop style and with large shields, have not been seen on the streets massively preventing opposition actions during the months preceding the July 28 elections, as used to happen in 2014, 2017 and 2019.

The situation in the FANB is no different. But perhaps the icing on the cake is the statement by Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López on July 23^rd. “To the keyboard politicians, to the ‘surveycrats’ and other intriguers who wonder: What is the FANB going to do on July 28? We respond to them that we will do what we have always done: defend the Constitution and popular sovereignty. Make no mistake,” he said.

He also added: “Whoever wins should get on with his government program and whoever loses should leave and rest. That’s all”.

In 2015, when the opposition won the parliamentary elections, a series of unofficial versions published by international media attributed to Padrino López the decision to have enforced the result that was contrary to the party of President Nicolás Maduro. Since then, Padrino seems to be clear about the consequences of human rights violations.

Demobilized groups and other matters

2024 seemed to be a favorable year for the resurgence of the colectivos, as the groups of armed civilians who have defended the Bolivarian revolution in Venezuela are known. Two variables were combined that could boost these groups, which have never ceased to exist, but which had begun to weaken. On the one hand, the dismantling of several mega-gangs, which left an open space for other armed groups, and on the other, it was an election year.

In the past, it was common for these groups to come out to attack opositores at political rallies and electoral events and they even participated, according to complaints from the former attorney general, Luisa Ortega Díaz, in the repression of protests against the government.

However, currently these groups are quite diminished, compared to years like 2017, when they played a leading role in the repression of demonstrations, to the point that they are accused of being responsible for the deaths of at least 28 protesters.

In the process prior to the elections of June 28, 2024, and during the electoral campaign, they did not have a greater presence or prominence.

In a monitoring project carried out with journalists from regions of the country, it was confirmed that there are groups in more than 15 states. Some of them continue to exercise social control and governance in the territories they occupy. They continue to have the capacity to generate violence and remain firm in defending the revolution.

But the majority have dedicated themselves to commercial and business activities that generate income. They deal with food marketing in some sectors and different businesses. Other members of these organizations were also affected by the complex humanitarian emergency that Venezuela is experiencing; many emigrated or abandoned the Bolivarian project.

Neither megabands, nor pranes

Non-state armed groups, such as megabandas and pranes, are part of the list of groups that generate violence in Venezuela. But many have been dismantled and others are weakened.

There are complaints that, in some cases, the mega gangs could have been used for social control of citizens in low-income sectors, as was the case with el Koki’s gang, which exercised criminal governance in Cota 905 between 2013 and 2021. Or as happened with Tren de Aragua in the town of San Vicente.

However, today many of these criminal structures have been dismantled by the Government, some have fragmented, and others have migrated to rural and border areas, such as the Orinoco Mining Arc, where they are dedicated to organized crime.

Between 2021 and 2022, the leaders of the Tren del Llano and El Koki’s gang, two of the most powerful criminal organizations in the country, died at the hands of the security forces – which meant a hard blow for these organizations.

Subsequently, between September and October 2023, six prisons that were under the control of the pranes –criminal leaders of the prisons– were evicted, and although the whereabouts of the heads of the criminal organizations that operated from these facilities are unknown, their activities criminal activities were affected.

The strength and interests of the mega-gangs that still remain in the country are not the same as those they had in their peak years, between 2013 and 2023. It is difficult to think that they would neglect their criminal businesses to get involved in political affairs, which in the past have not been of their interest.

This does not mean that the rise and power of organized crime should be ignored, in addition to the significant presence of the ELN in some border states.

We can no longer talk about polarization

The political polarization that divided Venezuelans into two large opposing groups during the last 25 years does not exist today either. There are no longer two great halves with different interests and positions.

Journalistic work carried out in the communities by the media shows that “in the country a reconstruction of the social fabric is taking place, based on the reconciliation of people and groups that in the past had differences for political reasons, which even led them to leave to communicate,” explained Jonathan Gutierrez, co-director of Historias que Laten.

This has been happening for approximately two years in low-income and rural areas. “At a time when many countries in Latin America and the United States are marked by polarization, we see how a process of depolarization taking place in Venezuela,” Gutiérrez said.

Today in Venezuela there is a large majority that supports peace, reconciliation, and democracy. Therefore, the possibility of a bloodbath occurring or a civil war occurring in the country is unlikely.