Caracas Chronicles

One week before the presidential election on July 28^th, Venezuela holds its breath. Uncertainty increases as we seem to approach the scenario of an “unstoppable force meets an immovable object”, given that a majority wanting change encounters a government unwilling to abandon power. According to the most recent Delphos survey, more than 72% of the voters has a negative view of Nicolás Maduro’s government and up to 59% are willing to vote for Edmundo González Urrutia (only 24% say they will do so for Maduro).

Given the immense number of possible combinations, we decided to assume some base conditions: there will be a presidential election on July 28^th, and the opposition may have a candidate on the ballot that day. From there, we imagined four possible scenarios about what would happen within the ruling coalition.

Scenario 1: Maduro “wins” the election

Don’t get us wrong: we believe it is unlikely that Nicolás Maduro would win this election if there were fair and competitive electoral conditions. But our land has proven to be fertile for the unprecedented. Chavismo has many tools at its disposal to ensure that there are more Maduro ballots on July 28^th –enough to be able to claim victory. These tools range from assisted voting, intimidation and clientelism to disabling the MUD card or the opposition candidate days before the election. A cocktail of these tools could confuse and discourage opposition voters, which could translate into considerable abstention and a large number of invalid votes.

This scenario seems unlikely, but not impossible, and it would be the best one for Chavismo: having most of the ballots, Maduro could put together a fairly-verifiable case that he won the election in front of the international community, in order to be recognized as the legitimate president. Once there, we predict that Maduro would move quickly towards normalizing relations with the U.S. and getting rid of sanctions. Maduro would have a strengthened internal position, at least enough to contain and exclude other chavistas who aspire to take the leadership from him. He would give a clear demonstration to the rest of his coalition that he can effectively lead this “normalization” process. 

Certainly, there are sectors of Chavismo that would like a leadership readjustment, but they prefer an internal process rather than a long parable that includes time out of power. 

That is why we consider this scenario as Chavismo’s Plan A, the one that entails fewer costs and presents greater profits – especially when compared to Plan B.

Scenario 2: Maduro steals the election

If the bans on candidates do not occur, the Chavista electoral machinery is insufficient and/or the opposition mobilization is too high, the gap may become unbridgeable. In this scenario, the CNE announces an electoral victory for Maduro without the votes to support it. They take on a path they have not traveled before: openly stealing a national election. They could well publish forged results or simply declare Maduro the winner through a cloudy statement from CNE president Elvis Amoroso and then close the electoral process, with a tumbao of Perezjimenismo. Once this fraude has been committed, the future depends on the opposition and its electoral organization: will the team of María Corina Machado and Edmundo González Urrutia have sufficient evidence to denounce the steal?

Answering this question opens an array of possibilities about the internal behavior of Chavismo. If the opposition does not have the records to prove González’s victory, the government is likely to close ranks around Maduro and try to repeat the scenario of the 2013 presidential elections, where Henrique Capriles refused to recognize the electoral result alleging irregularities but never had enough records to prove his victory. But if the opposition has the receipts to prove its victory, we find ourselves facing an extreme situation: Chavismo will appear as trying to steal the election, and it is likely that the opposition will try to claim its victory in the streets. In fact, according to the most recent Delphos survey, almost 40% of Venezuelans –and 58.8% of those who will vote for González Urrutia– consider that they should protest in case of fraud until the government recognizes its defeat. These are not numbers to be underestimated: Felix Seijas, director of the pollster, says that with 5% of the country on the streets, the mobilization would be equivalent to the 2002 protests.

This could be the biggest internal challenge that Chavismo has faced to date, especially given the internal fractures it has suffered recently. In this scenario, we believe that an internal crisis is looming within the regime, with different factions favoring different responses to the situation.

The two variables to understand the outcome of this crisis will be the military and the Chavistas who are pushing our local brand of Perestroika. 

We believe that the former would draw a red line for Maduro: they will not repress a critical mass in the street. But how many people constitute a critical mass? Where should these people be and what should their social composition be like? 

At the same time, we believe that the latter led Chavismo to this election under minimal conditions because they –and the economic interests they represent– need to be legitimized to be able to operate their businesses under normal conditions. Sustaining a fraud with repressive violence will blow up any international legitimation that lifts the status of pariahs to which the West has subjected the Chavista State. 

This is the essence of 28J: if one or both of these groups decide that they are not willing to support a fraud, a series of events could be unleashed that begin a transition to democracy: as happened in the Philippines in 1986.

Scenario 3: Maduro accepts defeat

Given the costs and risks that must be assumed to implement the Plan B of the second scenario, Maduro and other actors could decide that this route is undesirable. Then, this coalition eager for social peace and political legitimation aborts any attempt to commit fraud and forces the recognition of an opposition victory. From there, it is likely that a negotiation process would open between Chavismo, the opposition and international stakeholders to begin to shape a Venezuela where Edmundo González is president. The six months after the election would be tense, with significant potential for political and social volatility. But those who would have to interfere for Edmundo to be declared the winner (for example, the military and the Perestroika Chavistas) would also be interested in a peaceful transition.

This need is produced by the double conflict that would be unleashed in Chavismo after a victory of the opposition on June 28^th: a competition for leadership and a struggle to accompany or block the transition. On the one hand, an electorally defeated Maduro would lose legitimacy to exercise power for the next six months. He is probably aware of this and would be forced to make significant concessions (to Chavistas, the military, the opposition, and the international community) to sustain himself and ensure both his personal security and any political capital he has left after January 10^th. But this process could get out of control, and it is likely that others will challenge Maduro: governors, lawmakers and party officials who see Maduro as ballast and consider that relaunching Chavismo requires a change of leadership. At the same time, the Chavistas who are part benefitting of the transition would have to confront those reluctant to hand power over, and who are betting on boycotting the process.

Separating these two conflicts is important: people who dispute the leadership could nevertheless be able to make agreements on a negotiating or confrontational position regarding the change of government. The debate over what to make of González’s victory could bring the current opposition strange traveling companions.

Scenario 4: We do not know the result of the election

Finally, we have the most uncertain scenario of all. We arrive at the night of July 28^th and the CNE does not announce the results of the election. The 29^th dawns and we still don’t know anything. Days pass, even weeks. In the process, Chavismo is likely to justify the lack of results with an extraordinary event, real or invented.

We believe that if Chavismo responds to the election with silence it is because there is no agreement on what to do, but no one is willing to force an internal crisis. It’s Chavismo trying to hold their own, something that usually turns out well for them. But the outcome is obvious and inevitable: if they had the ballots, they would quickly declare victory. That they do not do so would tell us that they were defeated and that they are debating between plans A and B. In this case, time would play to chavismo’s favor because it gives more chance to reach internal agreements to stay in power (especially if they advance through fraud and repression).

In this case, external pressures would be decisive, both from the opposition and the international community: they will have to find the appropriate quantity and quality of pressure on key actors of Chavismo to unblock the game. Very little pressure leads to Chavismo gaining time and reaching internal agreements. A lot of pressure could build up and they return to a “siege mentality” that they may not come out of for a while.

The die is about to be casted. Happy Election Week!