Caracas Chronicles

How do you challenge a regime that is able to infiltrate all spheres of civil society, survives by absorbing blows and responding to challenges to its power, and is capable of creating division within your support coalition with relative ease? María Corina Machado’s answer is strategic ambiguity: a communication strategy that relies on revealing little information about your limits and tactics to allow leeway down the line.

After comfortably winning the opposition primary and being barred from running in the general election, social media was plagued by speculation about Machado’s next steps: would she call for electoral abstentionism? Name a proxy? Or support a consensus candidate appointed by the Unitary Platform? Her answers to most of these questions were frustratingly vague. The opposition’s strategy was as much a mystery for the government as it was to opposition sympathizers.

Because Machado had not established a clear roadmap or drawn the proverbial red lines on the sand, it became difficult for the government or the public to predict her next steps. Instead, they were forced to rely on assumptions based on her response to previous attacks on democratic processes.

From interpreting her previous statements saying there could be no fair election without her, analysts and observers would have expected her to call for a boycott of the election. There is no doubt that the government expected that barring her from running would have been enough to force her to call for a boycott of the 2024 election. However, as they say in Wall Street, “past performance is not indicative of future results”. Machado doubled down on her commitment to an electoral challenge to the regime and announced she was in it hasta el final.

The regime was frazzled by this new unpredictable foe and launched an all-out campaign to infiltrate and weaken the leader of the opposition. Immediately after the primaries, they arrested Roberto Abdul – electoral NGO Súmate’s director and the National Commision of Primaries’ closest member to Machado. In the past, arresting Roberto Picón, the opposition’s numbers guru, had proven an almost fatal blow. However, none of this did the trick. The regime also went after local and regional Vente Venezuela activists as well as campaign service providers.

On his talk show from hell, Diosdado Cabello repeatedly reiterated that Machado would not be allowed to run for years, in a clear attempt to demoralize her support base. With the guarantee of sanction reimposition and having their strategy to weaken Machado exposed, the regime had little to show for its efforts. Machado had actually gained on Maduro –and everybody else– in popularity and the government was no closer to understanding her strategy.

Thus came the harrowing arrests of Dignora Hernandez and Henry Alviarez, who remain under forced disappearance to this day. During his press conference announcing the arrests, Tarek Williams Saab also announced the issuance of seven arrest warrants against Machado’s inner circle, including crucial figures like Claudia Macero, Pedro Urruchurtu and Magalli Meda.

There is a common misconception that Maduro has undertaken this wave of arrests because it is weak and finds itself unable to contain the popular discontent against him. If Maduro were as weak as some people claim, he would have two options: either negotiate exit terms or outright neutralize Machado. Arresting or announcing their intention to arrest her closest collaborators helps with neither. The government arrests people because it can, and it can arrest people because it is in control.

Alternatively, this latest repressive wave against Vente Venezuela evidences that Machado’s strategy of ambiguity has been working. Not being able to predict how your opponent will react to your next move makes it difficult to maximize your payout. So far, the government’s whole playbook had only succeeded in barring her from the race but has not neutralized her movement. So, what do you do? You arrest the people that can give you an insight into your opponent’s mindset and isolate her closest advisors by forcing them to seek refuge in the Argentinian embassy.

Maria Corina Machado’s choice of a successor was a surprise to the entire country. Up until March 22nd, Machado had again skillfully avoided sharing whether she would name a successor or even who the successor would be. Social media has been plagued with names: Gerardo Blyde, Ramón Guillermo Aveledo, Magalli Meda, Andrés Caleca, Teresa Albanes, etc… If there had been a betting market on Machado’s successor, professor Corina Yoris would have had the same betting odds as any other Venezuelan. Yet, she was appointed.

After the deadline to file for the election passed and it became clear that Manuel Rosales had used his party’s ticket to endorse himself for the presidency, Machado refrained from making public statements. Unlike their leader, Machado’s closest collaborators took to Twitter to denounce the Zulia governor’s apparent treason.

Machado’s press conference on March 26th was a masterclass in strategic ambiguity. Much like she has done throughout this campaign, she skillfully avoided setting herself on a path of no return or adopting positions that she would need to backtrack in the future. Machado knows all too well how important Manuel Rosales is for the opposition’s aspirations for change; after all, he now represents two of the opposition’s available tickets, and is popular among one of the country’s largest constituencies. When given the opportunity to denounce Manuel Rosales, she restrained and kept the hopes of a unified opposition alive. While she talked about “disappointments and treasons”, she said she wouldn’t abandon the electoral route and simply ratified Yoris as her candidate. 

For his part, Manuel Rosales has also demonstrated a masterful understanding of strategic ambiguity. Rosales probably anticipated, or maybe was apprised of the fact, that neither Marchado nor her proxy would be allowed to run. Losing to her in the primaries would have dashed his hopes of replacing her when the time came. However, refraining from being a candidate but jumping first to congratulate Machado put him in a comfortable position within the opposition.

Rosales took great care to avoid making definitive statements regarding his presidential aspirations, even as his name gained strength as a possible replacement to Maria Corina Machado. As the filing deadline approached with no white smoke from the Unitary Platform, Rosales used proxies like UNT vice president Luis Emilio Rondon to float a potential Rosales candidacy. Simultaneously, they reassured people of their support for Machado or her designated successor. You didn’t really need to be a political mastermind to know Rosales wanted to be the opposition’s nominee, but you have to give him credit for playing his cards so close to his chest. Sadly, in this case, Rosales’ strategic acumen helped him fool the opposition instead of the government.

Fortunately, the events of March 25th were not enough to push the opposition away from its era of strategic ambiguity. Maduro’s latest dilemma greatly harmed the opposition but did not fully destroy the hard-fought unity built towards the upcoming elections. Similar to Machado’s ambiguity on if she will support Rosales or any other candidate in the future (“we go day by day”, she said in the press conference), Rosales also said in his first event as candidate in Zulia that he will support an opposition candidate that can overcome the government’s obstacles. The fact that neither Rosales nor the Unitary Platform leadership have definitively shut the door on a potential reconciliation is good news and a true testament to how much our leaders have matured.

Only time will tell whether this umpteenth attempt at a democratic transition will prove successful. There are a lot of moving pieces to put into place, and much remains unclear regarding the opposition’s next steps. Until then, we can at least find some comfort in not knowing what our leaders are planning.