Caracas Chronicles

“If the Maduro regime has in fact violated the (Barbados) agreements, of course we’ll take the necessary actions,” Secretary of State Tony Blinken said on October 31. “They are not getting a free pass for actions that contradict commitments made towards free and fair elections.”

Just hours before, Jesús María Casal and his deputies to the National Commission of Primaries were summoned to the Public Ministry and faced a six-hour interrogation. After María Corina Machado won in a landslide on October 22nd, the Supreme Tribunal of Justice waved a magic wand and ruled the elections null and void (“all its effects suspended”). Tarek William Saab took the cue. The Attorney General opened an investigation against the primaries’ chief and regional organizers on accusations of money laundering and fraud. The regime moved quickly to endanger the Barbados Agreements —or “make the string thinner”, as Machado says— testing the Biden administration’s resolve to lift oil sanctions provisionally.

To this date, Machado remains banned from running for office. U.S. officials have pressed the regime to disclose a process through which all aspiring candidates would be rehabilitados before December comes (their rights to compete in elections reinstated). A significant release of political prisoners —only five in October— is also yet to be seen. 

It’s November 30th, and we have no clue on whether the regime will concede to anything like that. We actually doubt so.

To better explain the skepticism, we must ask ourselves: what does the United States actually want in Venezuela? It may have been regime change during the Trump administration. But after years of unsuccessful attrition and maximum pressure to remove Chavismo from power, the U.S. is now looking for a legitimate counterpart in Caracas with whom they can cooperate more closely. We further believe that Washington’s plan to achieve this goal is indifferent to who occupies Miraflores, be it Maduro or someone else. Lifting sanctions and keeping them lifted is one big step to bring Venezuela back into the fold, away from the guiding influence of rival powers (i.e. China, Russia and Iran) and a chance to address the international network of non-state actors that operate in the country. Machado’s rise and victory in the primaries represents a challenge not only to Chavismo’s intentions of staying in power through minimally competitive elections, but also to the U.S.’ efforts to normalize relations with Venezuela.

How the stance shifted

Not too long ago, the United States had a different outlook of the country. Washington probably expected to reach 2024 with a demobilized and disorganized opposition that they could steer in whichever direction they deemed fit. This would likely take the form of a presidential election where Chavismo would come out legitimized and “open for business” with the West. But Machado’s rise has thrown a wrench at this plan: by mobilizing the opposition vote, Machado has regained some agency and legitimacy previously lost by the G4 opposition. This new opposition, led by Machado and her team, could take its supporters down a path that’s different from the rapprochement that Washington intended to pursue with Chavismo. The degree to which Machado can act independently should not be overestimated: the United States is still her strongest ally. But the momentum gained by Machado —and her potential capacity to mess up any agreed-upon plans— may force Washington to consider the opposition as a stakeholder when making decisions in the near future. 

It’s November 30th, and we have no clue on whether the regime will concede to anything like that. We actually doubt so.

Of course, the Biden administration is also moved by immediate concerns that it feels must mitigate quickly. The Maduro regime is not just a matter of “narco-terrorism” (to use Trumpian slang) in the region anymore. Our crisis has a tangible policy effect within the U.S., having become a ceaseless source of migrants and a burden to elected Democrat officials across the country. The arrival of hundreds of thousands Venezuelan asylum-seekers has disrupted the provision of shelters and services for migrants in places like Chicago, New York City and Denver. Local response has been rather diverse, yet these cities are reportedly underfunded to cope and its mayors are lobbying the Biden administration for billions in federal aid.

The U.S. has given a hot and cold treatment to the diaspora. It nearly doubled the number of work permits available for Venezuelan migrants —now the largest national group under Temporary Protected Status (TPS)— and struck a deal with Maduro to extradite undocumented migrants in charter flights. The number of Venezuelans arrested at the U.S.-Mexico border halved shortly after announcements from Homeland Security, but it will take months to see the real results. 

The U.S. may be gambling that sanctions relief can promote an “understanding” with Maduro that benefits trade and eventually slows down the exodus. It’s a huge bet. 

If Maduro stays in power after 2024, the Americans would need Miraflores to pursue unprecedented and swift economic reforms that improve living conditions for the majority of the people. For the national oil industry, the distant promise of going from ramshackle piggy bank to serious energy provider also depends on said reforms, continued access to Western markets, and legal security and guarantees for investors.

The collateral effect of American foreign policy

The dynamics of U.S. policy in Venezuela since 2017 also reflect broader issues that Biden faces around the globe. On both reputational and policy scales, the U.S. is under pressure over the unconditional support given to the Zelensky and Netanyahu governments, now facing dead ends to defeat Russia and destroy Hamas. Venezuela is another example of how empowering its dependents can later put the White House in an uncomfortable position. The politicians trusted by Republicans and Democrats to oust Maduro, oversee PDVSA’s operations in the U.S., and protect Venezuelan assets abroad are in exile, lack political capital at home, and could soon lose CITGO despite legitimate efforts to save it from creditors. The U.S. probably won’t stand this sort of proxy involvement in the future, one that upsets the Chavista elite so much. This is why the Americans negotiated the Barbados Accords by themselves, and refrain from endorsing or opposing any names in the presidential race.

The U.S. may be gambling that sanctions relief can promote an “understanding” with Maduro that benefits trade and eventually slows down the exodus. It’s a huge bet. 

In theory, reimposing sanctions would go against what the Biden Administration is pursuing in Venezuela: economic stabilization, productive negotiations, and a presidential election that yields an internationally recognized government. If this is achieved, Washington could reestablish diplomatic relations with Caracas and try to bring the two countries closer together. 

However, inaction from the U.S. over the ban from running for office of the opposition’s sole champion could prompt stronger calls for competitive elections and Machado’s right to compete, followed by the prolonged (or aggravated) targeted repression of angry voters and civil society groups. A severe reinstatement of sanctions in the midst of (or caused by) a breakdown in negotiations with Chavismo could turn the clock back to 2017 and 2018: elections are not competitive, the opposition refuses to participate, protests take place across the country, and the levels of political violence rise again while Maduro organizes an electoral party just for him and his clients. Machado loses in both scenarios, and the costs of an understanding between the White House and Maduro would jump in the medium term.
Where’s the middle ground, then? In the coming weeks, Maduro could see some clauses of the OFAC General License revoked (such as the Minerven waiver), or a decision from the Biden administration not to renew sanctions relief after April —but could later allow corporations that recently made deals with PDVSA to operate in the country through specific licenses à la Chevron. But that wouldn’t necessarily be a solid stride towards the fair elections Blinken spoke of. If the Americans don’t go further in promoting a decent contest next year, will Maria Corina Machado and other opposition groups be crafty enough to maintain the momentum brought back by the maverick in bleu celeste?