We’re Too Rich to be this Violent

Like everything else about Venezuela’s violence epidemic this chart, put together by Amherst Political Scientist Javier Corrales together with one of his research students, is deeply troubling. Plot countries’ murder rates against their per capita income and, not surprisingly, you find richer countries are less violent. Venezuela, though, lies far off the trend line, in on a gory murder plateau that only far smaller, far poorer countries usually occupy.

Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Jamaica…you can see how very small, very poor countries like those would have trouble mustering the resources to establish order again if faced with a big spike in violent crime.

But Venezuela is neither tiny nor resource poor. We’ve had 1,000,000,000,000 petrodollars (yup, that’s a trillion) rain on us over the last 13 years, plus we’ve gone through a revolution that was supposed to usher in an era of universal brotherhood and harmony built on a platform of social justice. Yet still we’ve seen the murder rate quadruple.

How could a country this rich get to be this violent?! That’s the question I try to get at in my new IHT Blog Post.

[Hat Tip: J.Corrales.]

50 thoughts on “We’re Too Rich to be this Violent

  1. I believe it was Manuel Caballero who early on pointed out the similarities between the (t)hugogracy and other fascist regimes’s cozyness with criminal elements of society they tapped to man their shock brigades.
    I also wonder how is it that the “perception of insecurity” does not seen to have an effect on the country’s leadership.

  2. Perhaps a companion chart could be Homicide rate versus GINI at PPP, rather than GNI per capita at PPP.

  3. Great article.
    I am a bit surprised by the homicide rates in Colombia (>35) and Brazil (~30). Venezuela has worsened during the last 13 years and we are much worser than them now, but has the situation in Colombia and Brazil worsened or improved during that time? Of course, Colombia has the guerrilla, narcotraffic and whatnot, but Brazil doesn’t. What’s happening there? I know that the comparison with Iraq has a lot of punch, but probably a comparison with Brazil/Colombia might be helpful.

  4. Quico – I think you’re basically right in your IHT article. But a few quibbles. One possibility you don’t address is that all of those 5 countries you name are major drug transshipment locations. In addition, you find more such murder rates along the drug routes in Mexico and the US. There may be fewer drugs passing through Panama and the Pacific now, and more through Venezuela. This would be an issue whether or not the government was involved.

    That brings up the second point, which I’m sure other commentors will make: that the government itself is involved in some of the crime. The police forces commit many murders and kidnappings. This isn’t just an issue of investment, it’s an issue of effective management. Which isn’t a strong point for the current government.

    Plus, a quibble. The term “drink the kool-aid” is offensive in current usage as well as being inaccurate. Many of the people at Jonestown didn’t drink the poison voluntarily, but the expression implies that they committed suicide, rather than having been murdered. Also, it wasn’t mixed into kool-aid but flavor-aid. This message has been brought to you by bodzin branding consultants.

    • Hi Sapito,

      i understand “drink the kool-aid” as a reference to the electric kool-aid acid tests, made (in)famous in Tom Wolfe’s novel of the same name.

  5. Hmm, maybe there is a -slight- correlation, but how do you explain that most countries are not violent, despite of being “rich” or not? (btw. what is the meaning of the circles and triangles?) Otherwise, I would say, a violent country can’t become “rich”. I would look for a better explanation…

    • The slope of that line does not seem like “slight” correlation, though you are right that even correlation would not imply causation. In Quico’s article, however, he points to many ways that are almost no brainers in reducing violence at which money is not being thrown in Venezuela, which is the underlying argument: given Venezuela’s increase in resources there is no excuse for not having at least a similar increase in an improved crime fighting chain of institutions, whether it translates to reduced crime or not.

      • The slope is only so good if the data fits close to the slope, I don’t think it is the case. Sure you could always draw a line, but is this significant? and second what is the reason if it is? Take the dots first (what are they again?) now how looks the slope? Take the triangles, how see the slope for the triangles only? Do you think the slope for the all the points is meaningful? I think this is the typical case when you add two different groups.
        Of course you can and use money to reduce violence, but reading a correlation between income and violence from the data looks wrong to me.

        • The association (to use a looser word) between murder and money is clearer if instead of a straight line you imagine a curved line, as in a leaning parenthesis. Obviously, a factor analysis would help determine how big a factor money is in the murder rate correlation, if at all.

        • Nice site. If you change the y-axis to logarithmic scale, you will see the correlation clearly. You will even see that the power law index seems the same for Latin America but the whole curve is scaled up.

          I do not like the plot in the main post. First the correlation line is suspect. Come on, how do you know you do not have some outliers that pull the line up? That line would not be considered a good fit anywhere (and I suppose economists know that, no?) All the points are clustered at the bottom and it is difficult to see. But if you make the log-log plot then it becomes clear and perhaps Venezuela is not such an anomaly after all. All Lat-Am is!

          Actually, Africa is kind of flat if you remove Mauritius.

            • Right, and the fit is just not good. So what can one conclude from it?

              See, all the points that pull the trend up in the low income side are Latin American, so what if the trend is different for them? Then you just can’t fit a straight line here. No?

              After seeing the plots vs GDP per capita in Gapminder, I think it’s a regional effect and not just Venezuela. Intriguing.

              • The purpose of a straight line fit is precisely to detect a slope in noisy data, such as the graph above. The fact that it slopes down to the right is an indication that the data tends to diminish in murders as GNI per capita increases, at least as an aggregate. It’s really just a visual aid, in this case.

      • The worst part is that is not just incompetence in implementing policies, it’s a lack of policies. The disregard of a government towards crime and the criminal system overall. They truly don’t care. Somehow, a strong stance against crime is contradictory with the overall Chavista speech.

        • I think much of the chavista stance began with the “revolutionary” the oppressed have the right to be violent against the oppressors, then it just got out of their control.

          • A speech that promotes class warfare indirectly legitimizes stealing, at least against the rich. This and the communist rejection of liberal laws pretty much make logically impossible fro chavismo to take a strong stance against violence, when you are saying that in some instances violence and breaking the law is justified (4 de febrero, invasiones). They know this and crime will never be their priority.
            Apart from that, Chavismo is THE almost literal definition of a populist government. They only implement policies that allows them to win elections or that harm their enemies. The problem in Venezuela with violence is very serious and the numbers are ghastly. But is not serious enough to be an election defining priority. Chavismo will only invest a lot of time, money and work in something that has a very substantial electoral payoff and crime is not included in that category.

          • For your information, that is not an accurate description either of Chavez’s stance, or of the evolution of his views on the subject of the political use of violence. It may be true that Chavez believes “the oppressed have the right to be violent against the oppressors”, but he has not always maintained that violence should be exercised. (‘Just because one has the right to do something, doesn’t mean one should do it.”) He has consistently championed peaceful means of fighting oppression whenever possible. However, for years, as head of the MBR-200 in the eighties to the 1992 coup attempt, Chavez was obviously under the impression that peaceful means were NOT possible. But after rising to popularity in the 90s, he abandoned the armed struggle (which he no longer saw as necessary) and adopted an electoral strategy, seizing an opportunity to carry out peacefully what in other countries would likely require violent action. Chavez’s popularity has enabled him and his supporters to operate largely in accordance with democratic processes (although there are shameful exceptions); in contrast, it has been the opposition that has most often sanctioned use of violence. Witness the 2002 coup attempt and other thwarted conspiracies, the economic sabotage, the fugitives of justice, the killing of campesinos, PSUV leaders, and pro-government activists, etc. the assassination of state prosecutors, government officials, etc. the burning of INTI offices and other government buildings, various other plots. To be sure, the opposition has also participated in elections (after disastrous boycotts), the unsuccessful recall referendum, etc. Although it does turn out that ‘political violence’ is only a small percent of the total violence in Venezuela, if anyone deserves to be criticized for encouraging extra-institutional violence against one’s political enemies in Venezuela, it’s the opposition. ICG data has revealed that “the vast majority of people killing in political violence since 1999 have been Chavez supporters”.

            • If instead of taking for granted what a clearly deceiving and skewed article says about the ICG report you had actually read it or a least the summary., you’ll see that it says almost the exact opposite of many of the thing you are saying. Here is the summary:
              Every half hour, a person is killed in Venezuela. The presence of organised crime combined with an enormous number of firearms in civilian hands and impunity, as well as police corruption and brutality, have entrenched violence in society. While such problems did not begin with President Hugo Chávez, his government has to account for its ambiguity towards various armed groups, its inability or unwillingness to tackle corruption and criminal complicity in parts of the security forces, its policy to arm civilians “in defence of the revolution”, and – last but not least – the president’s own confrontational rhetoric. Positive steps such as constructive engagement with Colombia as well as some limited security reform do not compensate for these failures. While the prospect of presidential elections in 2012 could postpone social explosion, the deterioration of the president’s health has added considerable uncertainty. In any event, the degree of polarisation and militarisation in society is likely to undermine the chances for either a non-violent continuation of the current regime or a peaceful transition to a post-Chávez era.

              A significant part of the problem was inherited from previous administrations. In 1999, the incoming President Chávez was faced with a country in which homicide rates had tripled in less than two decades, and many institutions were in the process of collapse, eroded by corruption and impunity. During the “Bolivarian revolution”, however, these problems have become substantially worse. Today, more than ten people are murdered on the streets of Caracas every day – the majority by individual criminals, members of street gangs or the police themselves – while kidnapping and robbery rates are soaring. By attributing the problem to “social perceptions of insecurity”, or structural causes, such as widespread poverty, inherited from past governments, the government is downplaying the magnitude and destructive extent of criminal violence. The massive, but temporary, deployment of security forces in highly visible operations, and even police reform and disarmament programs, will have little impact if they are not part of an integrated strategy to reduce crime, end impunity and protect citizens.

              The presence of international organised crime groups is also nothing new, but there is evidence of increased activity during the past decade that in turn has contributed not only to the rise in homicides, kidnappings and extortion rates, but also to a growth in micro drug trafficking, making poor and urban neighbourhoods more violent. Venezuela has become a major drug trafficking corridor, and different groups, including Colombian guerrillas, paramilitaries and their successors, have been joined by mafia gangs from Mexico and elsewhere in benefiting from widespread corruption and complicity on the part of security forces, some of it seemingly tolerated by individuals in the highest spheres of government.

              The government has displayed a particular ambiguity toward non-state armed groups that sympathise with its political project. Urban “colectivos” combining political and criminal activities, including armed actions against opposition targets, operate largely unchallenged and with broad impunity. The Bolivarian Liberation Forces have established control over parts of the border with Colombia, while the FARC and ELN guerrillas from the other side have long found shelter and aid on Venezuelan soil. In the context of the rapprochement between Presidents Chávez and Santos, the cost-benefit ratio behind the unacknowledged alliance between Colombian guerrillas and the Venezuelan government appears to have changed. However, it is still too early to be certain whether the government is willing and able to translate positive commitments and some initial promising steps into effective, sustainable action against such groups.

              Violence and corruption have been facilitated by a steady process of institutional erosion that has become particularly manifest in the justice system and the security forces. While impunity levels soar, highly dysfunctional and abusive police have endangered citizen security. Heavily politicised, the armed forces are increasingly seen as part of the problem, enmeshed with organised crime and pressed by the president to commit themselves to the partisan defence of his “revolution”. The creation, arming and training of pro-governmental militias further increase the danger that political differences may ultimately be settled outside the constitutional framework, through deadly force.

              In this highly charged environment, political violence has so far remained more a latent threat than a reality. However, as the country heads into what promises to be a fiercely contested presidential election, with very high stakes for both sides, this fragile equilibrium may not hold. Moreover, uncertainties provoked by the president’s illness have compounded short- and medium-term prospects. The greatest danger is likely to come after the election, regardless of who wins, since the entrenched levels of violence are prone to undermine either peaceful regime continuity, hand-over to a successor or any transitional arrangement. Moreover, whatever the political complexion of a future government, the extensive presence of organised crime networks is likely to seriously threaten medium- and long-term stability. The necessary actions to avoid that scenario must begin with a commitment by all sides to peaceful constitutional means of conflict resolution and with effective government measures to disarm and dismantle criminal structures, restore the rule of law and root out corruption in state institutions.

              • By the way the Al Jazeera news claim that the “ICG data has revealed that “the vast majority of people killing in political violence since 1999 have been Chavez supporters” is nowhere to be found in the report which concludes in the section regarding political violence that most of the political violence comes from the government or government supported groups.
                Your definition of opposition is tendentious, even if the claims about these killings are true, they have not been endorsed, promoted or celebrated by HCR of opposition parties. You only assume that because they were allegedly perpetrated by rich land owners they belong to the opposition (Revolutionaries can be rich land owners too, just ask future President Diosdado Cabello)Hugo Chavez, personally, and his government have participated and celebrated acts of political violence.

              • That’s a nice, measured response, CACR. My own take was that this kid, with his capacity to go from 155,000 coffins to it’s the opposition’s fault in a single short blog comment, could cash in BIG TIME if he hauled himself off to Caracas and hawked himself at A. Izarra/Evita G.

                He’s a fairly ok writer, with that rare match of decent grammar with an unending willingness to swallow propaganda lines. His timing might be a bit off, though – he’s a bit late to the party. Still, with that skillset, it’s a sellers market out there…

              • Today, I went to the Capriles rally for his registration as candidate (excellent turnout by the way) I rode the subway back home and saw the posters of a campaign by the Presidential Commission for Disarmament with local celebrities urging people to stop violence.
                I was left wondering, Are the 155,000 coffins just a PR problem? Is it people responsibility to guarantee their own safety when criminals are a tiny minority terrorizing the entire population because of the incapacity of the State? Is Winston Vallenilla going to convince malandros to voluntarily hand over the illegal weapons? If that’s the answer of the government to the violence problem then the troll might be advising them

            • Your claiming chavez’s has been promoting nothing but peaceful means since his first appearance, a violent and criminal coup attempt, reminds me of the aliens in Mars Attacks, where they go disintegrating everyone while playing on loudspeakers: “We come in peace.”

              Wake up. chavez speach is divisive, hateful, and inciteful, while his actions are at least enabling.

            • I never said that the claim (that “ICG data has revealed that ‘the vast majority of people killing in political violence since 1999 have been Chavez supporters'”) could be found in the ICG report. The claim can be found in the Al Jazeera article, which is why I cited it. Its author criticizes the ICG for failing to interpret properly “the figures provided in [its] own report”.

              The ICG holds the Chavez government responsible for violent crimes committed against Chavez supporters, because investigations were closed, too few arrests were made, or amnesties granted. However, as the article explains, the ICG ignores “key facts” (that Chavez opponents are well-positioned–as state governors, mayors, legislators, judges and police chiefs, etc.–to exacerbate violent crime, and that they also bear some of the responsibility) and “unequal social relations” (that the legal justice system remains in the hands of the middle and upper classes, and rigged in their favor) that underpin the political conflict in Venezuela”.

              I do hold the Chavez government responsible for the weakness of law enforcement. In addition to the government’s failure to bring these assassins of peasants to justice, “the amnesty of the elite coup-makers and economic saboteurs and the case of Danilo Anderson weighs heavily on the minds of militant Venezuelans who see it as an example of the continued impunity of the elite”. I believe that much of this is perfectly valid criticism.

              Just as I believe it would be valid to criticize members of the opposition for their responsibility in exacerbating if not perpetrating violent crime.

              • WTF? Quote from your post:
                ICG data has revealed that “the vast majority of people killing in political violence since 1999 have been Chavez supporters”.
                To any reader, that sounds as you are affirming that the ICG data supports your claim that most of the political violence comes from land owners that you assume are opposition members. Otherwise, you would have written that the Al Jazeera article supports that claim, but you misleadingly wanted to cover your unsupported affirmation with the veneer of legitimacy that it derived from the ICG study. When you write a claim, you are assuming that fact to be true and you carry responsibility for its accuracy, putting a link is just a way of backing the claim you are making.
                This is really ironic, you despise that imperialistic institution (ICG), yet you distort the facts so their study supports your allegations.(Because otherwise no one would believe it)

              • Regarding the other issues:
                (that Chavez opponents are well-positioned–as state governors, mayors, legislators, judges and police chiefs, etc.–to exacerbate violent crime, and that they also bear some of the responsibility)
                There are not Chavez opponents positioned as Judges. Unlike in the US, there are no State Courts in Venezuela since the 1940′. The Judiciary in Venezuela is controlled and appointed by the central government, most of the judges lack tenure, and the government has constantly removed politically independent judges and has packed the Court with allies. The legislative power in Venezuela has been completely irrelevant in the last years, thanks in part to the suicide tendencies of the opposition it was controlled by the government until 2010 and the borderline dictatorial enabling laws enacted by the Assembly. The Prosecutor Officer, appointed by a Chavista Asamble bears a lot of the responsibility for the impunity in Venezuela.
                (I do hold the Chavez government responsible for the weakness of law enforcement. In addition to the government’s failure to bring these assassins of peasants to justice, “the amnesty of the elite coup-makers and economic saboteurs and the case of Danilo Anderson weighs heavily on the minds of militant Venezuelans who see it as an example of the continued impunity of the elite”. I believe that much of this is perfectly valid criticism.)
                Chavez was a coup monger favored by amnesty. Back again to the good coups/ bad coups theory that so many people favor. Danilo Anderson’s investigation proved to be a major framing of innocent people by using a professional liar as the only evidence to prosecute political opponents, if you consider that something as evidence of violence from the opposition, you have a very interesting way of seeing things.
                (and “unequal social relations” (that the legal justice system remains in the hands of the middle and upper classes, and rigged in their favor) that underpin the political conflict in Venezuela”.)
                If you think that someone is disqualified to hold a government position because of his social class, then propose a new law that allow only poor people to have a government position. Sadly, I’m not Marxist (If you have any leverage with the government make them fire Diosdado and Rafael Ramirez.)

              • I am really annoyed that the comment system on this blog prevents me from responding to you directly. CACR, this comment is written in response to you.

                I resent your assumption that I am somehow acting in bad-faith. I did not come here with the intent to deceive anyone–but to make an effort to engage respectfully with those with whom I disagree. Why would you make it harder than it already is for me?

                Listen: I did not realize that what I said in my first comment was so misleading. In my second comment I attempted to set the record straight and explain what it was I meant. (The ICG does not support my claim, but “figures provided in ICG’s own report” does.) The idea that I was deliberately seeking to “distort” the facts is undermined by the fact that I linked to an article that explains precisely what I meant to express.) But now that this matter is straightened out, you prefer to remain hung up over this?

                Anyhow, the ICG mention was only a small part of the article, added rather hastily. If there’s anyone here who isn’t so hot-headed, I would actually like to engage someone on these points. If further citations, evidence is demanded, I am up to the challenge.

        • Chavez-rejects “western logic’. Similar to Mugabe- rejects it as “white law” and the source of all evil.(Look at the articles in the constitution in Bolivia- community vigilante justice- stonings, burnings…for example)Remember the BS about “human rights are just extensions of the empire over us” we must withdraw..blah-blah. Philosophy of ALBA
          and noone in Venezuela stops and thinks WHY?

  6. I like the fact you’ve highlighted this interesting research, although as you say the system was already broken pre-Chavez. There were (still are) dozens of different police forces with different political masters pulling in slightly different directions. Add to that a myriad of jurisdictions, which often compete, and a pathetically under resourced judicial system, and you have a mix ripe for criminality to thrive. None of that excuses the quadrupling of the murder rate. But it perhaps provides context to why criminality has been able to exploit current weaknesses so successfully.

    Has the Chavez government ‘taken its eye off the ball’? Or has it deliberately avoided engaging this issue? Many believe the government is reaping the rewards of insecurity by keeping potential opposition indoors. You could argue idealogically Chavez should have got really stuck in to insecurity. So it is at least puzzling why he has he continually avoided even acknowledging the issue.

  7. Many believe the government is reaping the rewards of insecurity by keeping potential opposition indoors.

    I find this kind of self-pitying navel-gazing ridiculous. “I know! To keep people in La Castellana indoors, we’ll have constant shootouts in Antímano!” (Not saying you hold this view, Bob-TB, but I know many do, and it angers me.)

    • I agree with you, Quico, that the ‘government-promotes-crime-to-scare-the-opposition’ line is nonsense. But I think your IHT piece is far too kind to the actual rrrrégimen. You accuse them of criminal negligence, which is a good start. But let’s face it, they are not just negligent but complicit. It’s not merely that they have, individually or collectively, broken every law in the código penal and gang-raped the constitution. They have systematically rigged the judicial system (Aponte Aponte dixit) to persecute the honest and reward the bad guys. Judges and prosecutors are instructed to ignore the presence of the FARC, for example, and to release drug-traffickers if they are acting on behalf of chavista generals. As if that were not enough, it seems the family of the JUSTICE MINISTER, ferchrissake, has been laundering millions derived from the narco trade and other forms of organised crime. Not to mention that the brother of one of his predecessors was a crooked banker on a huge scale. Investment? What difference would that make? They ‘invested’ billions in the electricity supply industry and now we have rolling blackouts everywhere except Caracas. For investment to make a difference it would have to be carried out by people with at least a vague notion of what they were doing, not to mention a serious interest in fixing the problem.

  8. Typical scene outside of Venezuela: I explain to some non-Venezuelan person that I emigrated because the situation in Venezuela was horrid. This person naively asks: What about Hugo Chavez? Wasn’t he doing great things for the quality of life in the country? That’s what we heard. I only describe the situation: On one hand 30% inflation, scarcity, awful salaries and what they mean for everyone not very rich… On the other hand runaway crime and what it means for everyone.

    I try to lead them with facts, to a quiet conclusion about this government’s self-advertised good intentions and the Revolution’s commitment to the “poor”: Sheer, utter, complete, perfect Bulls**t!

    Just the inflation means that except for a tiny minority controlling oil exports and resulting hard currency, we are very much like those very poor, drug-trafficking-scale countries. Plus, the “authorities” are actively engaged in making Venezuela a scale for drug-trafficking.

    Some wacko might be believing that after some generations of misery and pointless death they will through a kind of magic create this Utopian society. But if that is the case, Jim Jones was not much worse than them. You go to heaven at the end, so start murdering that senator, and have a drink!

  9. Must be a professional bias, but I see that graph and all that I see is an extremelly crappy regression

  10. The regression sucks, no doubt. If it is significant, it will have a very low r^2, meaning the % of the variance in the dependent variable explained by the independent one is low (low explanatory power). The issue is not” how could such a rich country be so violent”, but rather why are the five outlier countries (all in the Americas) so far off the central tendency. There have to be reasons other than lack of enforcement and judicial process. I suspect that many other countries have much worse police/thug ratios, overcrowded jails and inefficient judicial systems. So, what gives?

    By the way, I hope Corrales wasn’t planning on publishing that graph. It’s now in the public domain. He might have trouble using that graph in a paper now.

  11. Thank you everyone for debating the pros and (mostly) cons of this little graph. You have all made wonderful points. Thank you for posting it. I just want to clarify that I did not mean it as a regression. I did not even intend to claim correlation. I simply wanted to show how LAC countries, and especially Venezuela, are plagued by outlaws and outliers. To me, based on this discussion, it seems that there are three forms of outliers in this world of outlaws. One is regional, as some of you mention, hence the triangles to differentiate LAC from the rest (although this regional effect might be overstated by the data since everyone suspect that homicide rates in sub-Saharan Africa are underreported). The other is sub-regional: within LAC, there is a sub-category of extreme cases (Ven, Gua, Jam, Sal, Hon), as Toro says. And finally, country-specific: it seems that there is no country close to Venezuela in terms of income that comes close to Venezuela in terms of homicide.
    After reading your comments, I thought of one more little graph to produce. Homicide rates relative to defense spending.

    • “Homicide rates relative to defense spending.”

      Along those lines, I would suggest:

      Homicide rate versus Police Spending or Police Number per capita, and
      Police Spending or Police Number per capita versus GNI per capita

  12. Javier, I get late to this discussion and my point may have been raised before, I apologize if that is the case. I read Quico’s post before anyone had commented a couple of days ago and then this morning I suddenly remembered the plot and realized what I found was missing in that result.

    You are comparing the per capita income but there is no measure on the *spreading* of that income.

    In that respect, I would suggest to construct a plot that accounts for that spreading, if you have the data. For instance, plot the per capita income of the lowest X-tile of every population and compare it with the homicide rate. Or plot the variance of the income with respect to the homicide rate.

    I am pretty sure that if in that case you will find that Venezuela is not that bizarre.

  13. One comment: among countries under 10K income, 26 are under 10.0 (15 under 5); 4 from 10 to 30; and 6 up at 30-60.

    Then from 10K to 13K, there are only 2 countries under 10.0, but 8 from 10 to 30, and Venezuela and one other above 30. Maybe there is some “moderate income” trigger. (Low rates reappear above 13K.)

    Incidentally, the “drug violence” explanation doesn’t seem to fit. Mexico’s rate of about 14 is somewhat high, but far below the Central American highs, despite being the epicenter of drug violence.

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