45 thoughts on “Parrilla de Vaca Sagrada

  1. It’s a win-win. And this is evidence that even if morality and common sense don’t win the argument, when faced with bankruptcy and financial chaos, we will, regretfully, win the argument

  2. They don´t seem to realize that they´re setting a precedent that the next administration will find absolutely irresistible. I can hear Capriles speaking now, “following the modality that Hugo Chavez pioneered in Petropiar, we are moving forward to issue such and such stock in the NYSE…”

    Remember, Capriles is going to have no majority in the A.N. He will need to work with existing laws and regulations. This is a form of privatization he can pursue with zero legislative changes, without even re-writing chavista regulations! que manguangua…

    • I think Capriles,if elected,should force elections for a new AN, under the pretext that this one does not let him work. “Hey,you guys let Chavez work, now my boys need to let me work,get out,now.”

      • In theory he could, but only if he follows what article 240 of CRBV establishes:

        “La remoción del Vicepresidente Ejecutivo o Vicepresidenta Ejecutiva en tres oportunidades dentro de un mismo período constitucional, como consecuencia de la aprobación de mociones de censura, faculta al Presidente o Presidenta de la República para disolver la Asamblea Nacional. El decreto de disolución conlleva la convocatoria de elecciones para una nueva legislatura dentro de los sesenta días siguientes a su disolución.”

        However, just because he can doesn’t mean he should. I don’t see HCR doing this.

        • Probably the smartest move would be to negotiate and convince the least radicals to jump over the talanquera.Considering the experience of April 11th many when chavistas in the Assembly were willing to change sides and thanks to the TSJ a qualified majority is not needed now to pass organic laws. One of the challenges of an opposition government is negotiating with people in key positions is to negotiate with the least radicals to assure stability.

    • Some questions:

      1. If Chavez is incapacitated, does Juau (or whoever) inherit the special powers under the current enabling law? I believe the current enabling law doesn’t expire until July. That is a lot of time to do irreparable damage.

      2. When are new elections for the AN? 2014? That is a long time to govern with a National Assembly that is diametrically opposed to everything you want to do.

      3. How long until the new president can start to change the make-up of the TSJ?

      • 1. I dunno.
        2. 2015.
        3. The president doesn’t propose names for Supreme Court justices like in the US. A special comittee, formed by deputies and civil society members, gets the nominations from society (like Law Schools), Later, the Citizen Power (Fiscalia, Defensoria del Pueblo, Contraloria) makes its own proposals. The list goes to the Assembly. SImple majority for naming, 2/3 for dismissing. Only period of 12 years for a justice.

          • Regarding the Supreme Court, it would be easier to Jubilar con una buena pensión as many Justices as you can to avoid bad press and legal disputes. The Constitutional Chambers has such powers vested on it that if you get a majority in there, you could get away with a lot without needing the national Assembly. Does anyone remember the letter that Rincon sent to the new government after April 11? A lot of “chavistas” are going to drop like flies if the opposition wins, mucha gente va a querer es salvar el pellejo.

          • Just like with the assembly, many will try to save themselves and cut a deal.

  3. So… What is the word on the implications for the Venezuelan economy?

    And can anybody at ground zero tell us what kind of coverage this is getting?

  4. good show, quico. loved both titles and content, por supuesto.
    una pequeñez, and I’m by no means a stylistic expert, but ísn’t it better not to end a sentence, let alone your final one, with a preposition? Is ‘in’ not redundant? Can it be substituted for ‘to enter’?
    Just some puny observations …

    • It was written in technical language and was slightly complicated so…NOBODY NOTICED!

      (Insert your favorite variant on por eso es que estamos como estamos here)

      • I know it should be their job to be aware of this, but how about contacting some oppo deputies like Carlos Ramos, or those in the Energy Commission, and explain, slowly, in basic spanish, why this is important so they can understand what it’s all about and maybe, just maybe, do or at least say something about it?

        • Not even Capriles is in the loop:


          Pdvsa no será privatizada

          De llegar a la Presidencia de la República, el candidato de la oposición reiteró que las misiones y programas sociales se mantendrán y descartó la privatización de Pdvsa. “Las misiones sociales no son del Gobierno de turno sino de todos los venezolanos”.

          “No se ha planteado que nuestra industria petrolera pase a manos privadas. Es una empresa de los venezolanos” y agregó que el compromiso es “reducir la desigualdad social” .

          • Of course! HCR won’t privatize PDVSA…all he’ll do is some deals structured identically to the way this Chavez era deal was structured.

            Nobody would accuse chavismo of privatising the industry would they?!

            (in other words, HCR is playing the politics perfectly.)

            • Following the same line of thought wouldn’t it make sense to start talking about the wonderful things Venezuela could do for Cuba in a Capriles administration?  Imagine all the investment opportunities if Cuba opened up to a free economy.  Venezuela can be the trusted partner to help in that transition.  :)

  5. Regardless, I do not see who would buy into PDVSA stock. A company controlled by a leftist, arbitrary government, that uses the company to subsidize an sizable share of the Venezuelan and other Latin American economies is definitely not strong investment case. Plus, all the liabilities that could arise from legal actions taken by the multinationals that were expropriated by PDVSA would severely affect the valuation of the company. Honestly, in practice, do not see this happening.

  6. Hi, a couple comments. On the FP story: I didn’t get that they were saying Citic could float its shares. Rather, Citic is going to help PDV float some shares of an as-yet-unnamed subsidiary (or in Bloomberg-speak, a “unit”). From the description, it sounds like the subsidiary could be as big as CVP, the unit that holds PDV’s interests in all its joint ventures. It could also be some small piece of CVP, but I have a feeling it’s the big one.

    As Tom O’Donnell wrote in a comment over at my blerg, the Chinese have been frustrated by the lack of internal controls at PDV. Having the stock publicly traded puts more responsibilities on the company to be transparent with its finances. For example, the company’s long-time strategy of trading some of its dollars at the parallel rate and hence pumping up its bolivar position for its official books — that kind of shenanigan will be a bit harder if there are serious audits of the PDV books, with the risk of shareholder lawsuits and stock exchange regulator penalties for noncompliance.

    As far as who will buy PDV stock? Come on dude, it’s the second-best business in the world.

  7. I assume that you are referring to the oil business, because obviously PDVSA is not the second-best business in the world. Why would an investor buy into PDVSA stock given all the problems that both you and I listed above? Of course, if the stock is sold a precio de gallina flaca, then everyone would be all over it – but in that case, why would the government sell it?

    In principle, I agree with your views in the second paragraph of your post, but you are describing the case of a public listing in the US, London or other develop capital market. The chavista goverment would not comply with all listing rules of Hong Kong, Shangai or wherever they plan to list the company. There are a lot of companies out there with serious governance issues, specially in places like China.

    If the government is going to float a subsidiary, then things would be a bit less complicated. But still, all the issues mentioned before would apply to a lesser extent.

  8. Constitución Venezuela: Artículo 12. Los yacimientos mineros y de hidrocarburos, cualquiera que sea su naturaleza, existentes en el territorio nacional, bajo el lecho del mar territorial, en la zona económica exclusiva y en la plataforma continental, pertenecen a la República, son bienes del dominio público y, por tanto, inalienables e imprescriptibles.

    Por lo que PDVSA quizás no tenga para vender lo que normalmente se pudiese creer que tenga para vender… gracias a Dios.

    • Precisamente por esto es que cualquier uso de recursos que provengan de los yacimientos mineros y de hidrocarburos equivale a un impuesto de 100% a los que no tienen ingresos (contando a los menores de edad), y 0% a los ricos. La desgracia es que no solo los chavistas creen en hacer uso de estos recursos como mejor les parezca.

  9. Oops I forgot this one was in English

    The Venezuela Constitution states: Article 12: Mineral and hydrocarbon deposits of any nature that exist within the territory of the nation, beneath the territorial sea bed, within the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf, are the property of the Republic, are of public domain, and therefore inalienable and not transferable.

    And so PDVSA might perhaps not have to sell all that one normally would think it has to sell. Thank God.

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